German-Polish border, 1941-1951 by Williams, Ella Louise
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1953 
German-Polish border, 1941-1951 
Ella Louise Williams 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Ella Louise, "German-Polish border, 1941-1951" (1953). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, 
& Professional Papers. 2447. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2447 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
TH3 OEHKAN-POLIGB BORDER; 1941-1951
by
ELLA L091SE WILLIAMS
B.A., Peanaylvaala State College, 1951
Fresented In partial fulfillment 
of the requirement* for the degree of 
Master of Art*
jWORTANA STATE UR1V3QKKTT 
1955
UMI Number: EP35708
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
UMI EP35708
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
uesf
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1346
A :-h.
Thl* ha* been approved by tb# Board of azam-
iaara Im partial fulfillment of the requirement# for the 
degree of Maeter of Arte#
^ a irm a iT  o f th e  Board of BMminere
0(6(X\ » o . \^ûuo 
ean"of 'l^""03raduat® SoliëbïA .
Date
-11-
TABLZ OF 00NT2NT8
Oaaptttr Pag®
I. HI8T0RIGAL BAOKORCmiD......................  1
II. TEE WA5TIME NEOOTIATIONB AFFECTING IRE
GEBKAN-POLIgH B O R D E R ....................  21
III. TEE BORDER AND THE BREAKDOm OF ALLIED
U N I T Y ....................................  40
IV. TEE BORDER AND TEE FAIIURE TO WRITE A
GERMAN PEACE TREATY...................... *0
V. CONCLUSION................................  81
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................  8*
A P PENDII........................................  91
CRÆPTER I 
miWORIQAL BACKOaOOND
That part of the northern saropean plain lying between 
the Oder and Tiatula River* hietorleally 1# the area of 
German-Polleh border oonfliote. The Great Lowland plain 
lies In an equatorial direction, stretching in a fan-shaped 
manner from northern France into the whole of European 
Russia. Almost three hundred miles wide is the German- 
Polleh border area between the Baltic seaport of Danzig 
in the north and the West Beskld Mountains directly south.
A twenty to forty Inch rainfall like that of the Great 
lakes region in North America and gray-brown podzollc 
soils similar to the rich earth of our mid-Atlantic states 
enable the inhabitants of this area to engage in profitable 
enterprises. Never rising above three hundred and twenty- 
eight feet, the elevation drops to sea level near the river 
banks end the Baltic coast. To the south of the plain, 
from west to east, lie the Sudeten, the Beskld, and the 
East Carpathian Mountains. The Baltic sea cuts into the 
lowlands in the north, and into it flow the river systems 
of the Oder and Vistula at Stettin and Danzig respectively. 
At their nearest points, the Oder and Vistula are approxi­
mately two hundred miles apart, without a natural boundary, 
the area is the highway between Western and Eastern Europe.
8
1$ 1# this regioQ that both Qermms and Pole# oomtemd 
to be rightfully theirs• The laok of mmtural frontiers 
left open the territory between the Oder and Vistula for 
migration and oonquest. As Polish strength deollmed and 
German power increased, western Poland gradually diminished 
In area. Germany controlled Polish territories, some as far 
east as the Vistula and beyond, by the end of the eighteenth 
century. Thus, both nations occupied the Oder-Vistula re­
gion for long periods, and consequently, each claimed 
historical rights to sections at the exclusion of the other.
Because both nations have occupied the Oder-Vistula 
plain, the delineation of the Germenî^Pollsh border creates 
a problem. The frontier, situated too far to the east or 
west, satisfies only one group and develops Into a source 
of national Irredentlsm for the other. Loss of lend breeds 
hatred, revenge, end It Is a rallying force to war. Wheth­
er or not, the world war IX settlement of the border avoids 
German-Pollah friction requires, among other factors, an 
Investigation of regional history. Poland desires recog­
nition of the border along the Oder and western Neisse Elvers, 
If too far west, the Oder-Nelsse line will be a source of 
German Irredentlsm. An historical analysis of the border 
can foretell the extent to which German discontent may 
arise from the Oder-Nelsse line.
f#r$ II
Im 1740, Prm*#ia*8 tarrltory aloag the Polish border 
aad Baltie 8ea oonelated of Neemmrk, Bremdeabmr#, gmmterm 
Pomerania to the Oder, and the eastern aeotion of Western 
Pomerania, The Polish provinoea of West Prussia in the 
north and Posen to the south aeyareted 3ast Prussia on the 
Baltic from western German territory. Before irederisk the 
Great oonneoted Bast Prussia with the fatherland by eonquer* 
ing the intervening corridor, an opportunity arose for ex* 
pension in the south-east, It was the war of the Austrian 
Buooession that opened the door for Prussian territorial 
extension, Frederick participated in the war "in order 
that he mif^t rob a neighbor whom he had premised to de- 
feiWl."^ The neighbor robbed was Austria and the prise was 
Silesia,
When Maria Theresa ascended the Austrian throne after
the death of Charles VI on October 80, 1740, the recognition 
of the Pragmatic sanction by Buropean powers was necessary. 
Soon after, Frederick supported Maria Theresa by confirming 
his father’s recognition of the Pragmatic sanction while at 
the same time offering military aid if the need should arise, 
Althou^ Prussia was apparently friendly, Prusslmarmies 
invaded Silesia on December 18, 1740, end while Frederick 
completed a successful coup, he told Marla Theresa that he 
would support the Pragmatic Sanction if she would acknow-
1. Sir Charles Petrie, Diplomatic History. 1715-1959 
(London, 1948), p. 38,
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IWge M s  811#*ian olalm#. fieoause Rrane# and Sammy sup- 
ported the claims of the Sleetor Charles of Bavaria to the 
Hapshurg tha^ne, Marla Theresa had no other eholee hut to 
lose Silesia In an atteapt to win Prussia's aooesslon to the 
Austrian oause. In August 1748, Austria ceded Upper and
BLower Silesia to Prussia. What had formerly comprised the 
Austrlan-Pollsh frontier In the west, became the southern 
section of the Prusslan-Pollah border.
Thirty years later, the time was propitious for the 
partitions of Poland. Conditions and events had made It so. 
The weakness of the moribund Polish government, eteos&ing 
from the Infiltration of Russian influence into Polish 
government circles and the abuse of the liberum veto, cul­
minated In the election of a Russian puppet to the Polish 
throne after the death of Augustus II In 1763. He was 
Stanislaus Ponlatowskl of whom Catherine II said, "had the 
least right of all and must therefore feel more indebted to 
Russia than anyone else.*^ The policies of uniting all of 
the Slavs and spreading the Influence of the Greek Orthodox 
Church were two which dominated Russian relations with 
Poland. However, Russian Interests In the Balkans diverted 
Catherine's attentions, and she realized that Austria, who 
had been blocked in Silesia, also had Interests In the two
2. Ibid.. pp. 26-36.
3. Ibid.. p. 52.
s
power Tfiouume to her northeast end southeast. The Confedera­
tion of Bar, a reform movement, started the Polish Civil War 
In 1768. Although It was quickly suppressed hy Polish re­
actionaries with the aid of Busslan troops, the Insurrection 
definitely threatened Russian predomlnanoe in Poland»*
The decaying Polish kingdom attracted Prussia, Frederick 
met with Joseph II of Auetrle In 1769 and 1770 end came to 
the conclusions that only a partition of Poland could prevent 
a general war. Catherine soon realized the extent of 
Frederick's ambitions, and she believed that the latter would 
be a more valuable ally than Austria whenever Russia expanded 
Into the Balkans. While Prince Henry of Prussia visited St. 
Petersburg, she suggested the partition plan which proved to 
be favorable to his brother. Consequently, on February 17, 
1772, Russia and Prussia agreed to partition Poland, and 
Austria joined them In August. Frederick took West Prussia, 
making East Prussia contiguous to German territory, and thus, 
out off Poland from the Baltic.^
The Turkish declaration of war on Russia In 1786 
lessened Russian Intrigue In Poland whose diet them adopted 
a stronger constitution on May 3, 1791, Eight months later, 
however, the Busso-Turklsh war ended, leaving Russia free 
to deal with her western neighbor. Events In western
4. Reginald W. Jeffery, The New Europe. 1789-1889 
(Boston, 1911), pp. 15^-168.
5. Ibid.
mrope provide# en opportunity for Catherine.
I oudgel my brain# to urge the Courts of Vienna 
and Berlin to busy themselves with the affair# 
of Franoe. I wish than to do this that I might 
have my own elbows free. I have many unfinished 
enterprises and I wish these two courts to be . 
fully occupied so that they may not disturb me.
A French war was not a small possibility as time proved, for
on April 20, 1798, the Erenoh Assembly declared war on
Austria.*
Polish malcontents, who had been harbored in Russia
since the adoption of the May Constitution, formed the 
Confederation of Targowioe and supported the restoration 
of the old form of government. four days later, May 18, 
1792, Catherine ennounoed her support of the new confeder­
ation. On May 19, Russian troops crossed the polish border. 
The weakened government appealed to Prussia, but the latter 
announced that she had promised to defend the Poland of 1790 
and, therefore, that there was no casus faederia. Russia 
overrdielmed opposition within six weeks and liquidated the 
threat of Prussian or Austrian hegemony in Poland. Hot 
wanting Berlin and Vienna to draw together or cause them to 
abandon their interest in Prance, Catherine decided not to 
annex all of Poland. The idee of a second partition 
appealed to Frederick William. In March 1792, Prussia
6. Petrie, o^. cit.. p. 57.
7. Jeffery, 0£. cit.. pp. 156-157.
aad Bassia divided m*re Polish lead, sad Praseie took Damzlg, 
#Drm, and Posem.®
a desperate oause, the Poles united forces under 
losolusko» Prussia end Russia sent in troops, but again and 
for the last time, Poland bent before the force of the 
Bueslan armies who captured Warsaw on November 8, 1794.
When the empress suggested that "the time has come, not 
only to extinguish to the last spark the fire that had been 
lighted in our neighborhood, but to prevent any possible re­
kindling of the ashes," the existence of the kingdom of 
Poland was doomed. In the second partition of Poland,
Austria had received no territory. Prussia had been benefi­
cial as an ally as long as Poland had existed, but now her value 
decreased in comparison with that of Austria in the Balkan ques­
tion idiich was in the next plan of Bussien acquisition. Oon- 
sequently, Austria participated in the third partition, and 
Prussia received only the territory south of hast Prussia, 
called new gast Prussia.
In Central Europe, it was a fear of aissia and the 
open jealousy and distrust between Austria and Prussia which 
led to the three partitions of Poland. Bach feared the ag­
grandizement of the other; each was determined, in the spirit
8. Bernard Peres, A History of Russia (New York, 1951), 
p. 272.
9. Petrie, op,. oU., p. 60,
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Of the age, to seoure eompeneatlon; It was Impossible to think 
of Prussia and Austria oomblnlng In defense of German Inter­
ests to oppose Bussls# The October, 1795 settlement resulted 
In the extinction of the kingdom of Poland, and the Oermsn- 
Pollsh border was replaced by a German-Russian line,
Silesia, South Prussia, West Prussia, and New last Prussia 
formed the additions between 1740 and 1795 that enlarged 
the Prussian border area at the expense of Poland,
Part III
"I have two hundred thousand soldiers In the duchy of 
Warsaw,” said the tsar. "Let them try and drive them from 
It, I have given Saxony to Prussia.”^® This was the quid 
pro quo irtilch faced the Congress of Vienna In 1815. It was 
understood between the two powers that Prussia would give 
up some of her Polish lands in return for Husslan support 
to her claims of saxony. The Prusslan-Russlan agresmmit 
occurred In 1813, Having overrun Russia in 1807, Napoleon 
created the duchy of Warsaw out of Prussian and Austrian 
lands rather than from the acquisitions of Russia whose 
favor he was then seeking. Six years later, Ihissla and
Prussia concluded the Treaty of Kallsh and at the time
11.produced the apparent felt accompli.
10. Ibid.. p. 121.
11. Ibid.. pp. 120-121.
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The Prussian eastern border was no longer a question 
to be settled by the parties dlreotly effeeted. A ohange In 
its delimitation same at a time when a eontinentel m r  had 
been won by several powers. The questions of sazony and 
Poland were inextrloably linked. If an enlarged kingdom of 
Poland were created, Austria and Prussia then would demand 
compensation elsewhere. Austria would be satisfied with 
Italian and Illyrian gains, but it was known that Prussia 
demanded the whole of saxoi^.^^
In the settlement of the Prussian-Russian problem, 
the Vienna negotiators divided Into two oampa. Prance and 
Austria opposed Prussia and Russia; Great Britain assumed the 
position of mediator, but later joined the courts of Paris 
and Vienna. At first there were two Austrian policies. 
Metternlch'a extreme antipathy to the tsar caused him to 
oppose Russia's acquiring the whole of Poland; while on 
the other hand, his ministers, atedion and Gohwarzenberg, 
opposed Prussia's increasing her power In the German states. 
Gestlereagh discarded the Idea of restoratlng a free and 
Independent Poland and worked instead for a strong Prussian 
state to act as a counter with Austria In central mrope 
against the possible resurgenance of French and Russian 
aggression. The situation was also complicated by the 
schizophrenic character of Tsar Alexander, who at one time
12. Harold Nioolson, The .Congress of Vienna; A Study 
in Allied Unity (New fork, Ï941T, pp. Ï64-18Î.
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thmi0k% ot hîmeelf as a great general eonqnerlng lends as far
west as the Oder and at other times visioned himself as the
benevolent and enlightened'ruler following the *moral duty'
13of establishing am independent Poland,"
Yet it was the irrefutable login of Talleyrand that
pointed out the real danger, Russian imperialism;
Bmssia does not wish for the re-establishment of 
Poland in order to loose what she has aequired of 
it: she wishes it so as to acquire what she does
not possess of it. . . . Tima to re-establish 
Poland in order to give it entirely to Russia . . . 
and to extend her frontiers to the Oder, would mean 
or eating so great and imminent a danger for Birope 
that . . .  if the execution of such a plan could 
only be stopped by the force of aims, not a single 
moment should be lost in taking them up.14
On the other hand, Talleyrand did not agree with Oastlerea#i
that a strong Prussia would constitute a valuable mke-weight
in the Biropeen balance. Talleyrand also expressed the fear
of a strong German nation to the east: "If the Prussian
generals obtained their desires then, Prussia would in a
few years form a militarist monarchy which would be very
ISdangerous to her neighbors." The sagacity of Talleyrand's 
diplomacy cannot be overemphasized. He knew that France did 
not have the strength to continue an imperialistic program 
at this time. The reel danger lay with the victors, and 
the rise of the unsatisfied powers of Russia and Prussia
13. Ibid.. pp. 148-163.
14. Ibid., p. 155.
15. Ibid.. p. 156.
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threatened the belene# In inrope, #hlle Gmatlerea# wee 
fomlng his polloy in view of reeent events, Prenoh end Ans- 
trian policies looked to the future.^®
The Vienna settlement of central Airope was woven with 
mrenoh threads. The Bnaslan-Pmselan plan for Poland and 
8a%ony was watered down so that Prussia received only tmo- 
thlrds of 8a%ony and the klngdAs of Poland was created from 
the dttdhy of Warsaw and placed under the personal rule of 
Tsar Alexander I. The Polish province of Posen, taken by 
Napoleon for the duchy of Warsaw, was retroceded to Prussia, 
although the latter lost New hast Prussia, for the next
century, the provinces of last Prussia, West Prussia, Posen,
17and Silesia remained within the Prussian eastern border.
Part IV
The Poles were allowed a small measure of self-government, 
and because the tsar was to be called the "King of Poland," 
foreign powers recognized the existence of Poland, in theory 
at least. Prussian-held lands bordered Poland in the west 
and north for the next forty-eight years. At the end of 
this period, 1663, with the abolition of the constitution 
of Congress Poland by the tsar, the kingdom of Poland in
16. Ibid.. pp. 166-181.
17. Ibid.
1%
theory as well a# reality heeeme extlnet.^® There was me 
Prueelan-Polleh border. A Pruemlem-Boeelan boundary ezleted, 
and that beoame a Qerman-Buaeian border, whlob lasted until 
1914, after the formation of the Qermam Amplre under the 
Prussian king In 18T1.
It was Polish nationalism, although for one^hundred 
and fifty years uneuoeeasful In rewlwlng a free and Inde* 
pendent Poland, that was the Important factor In bringing 
about the creation of a German-Pollsh border after world 
War I. The first world war conflict was the opportunity 
for which the Poles were waiting. Were Austria, Germany, 
and Russia defeated, an Independent Poland would have Chance 
to rise. However, because they could not fight all three 
at once, the Poles decided to assist Austria rather than 
Russia. And the Russians made only vague promises and dis­
missed all attempts at mediation by Great Britain, France, 
and Italy as Interference in a domestic Russian question.
By 1915, Russian troops were driven out of most of Oongress 
Poland, and the country was divided Into Austrian and German
19administrative zones.
In order to obtain Polish military help, the Central 
Powers proclaimed the independence of Poland on November 5,
10. W. P. Reddaway et. al, (ed.). The Cambridge History 
of Poland (Cambridge, 1941), p. 276,
19. Ibid., pp. 126-130.
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191@, hut without fixing its borders or selecting a king.®® 
Bit two events in the early months of 1919 destroyed 
Geimany’s hoped-for snocess with the Polish people. On 
Jennary 22, 1917, President Wilson told the United States 
Senate that;
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not 
recognize and accept the principle that governments 
derive all their just powers from the consent of 
the governed, end that no right anywhere exists to 
hand peoples about frcm sovereignty to sovereignty 
as if they were property. I take it for granted, 
for instance if I may venture upon a single example, 
that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there 
should be a united, independent and autonomous 
Poland.21
Although there was no agreement in either belligerent 
camp concerning Poland, this statement from the strongest 
neutral power was not to be disregarded. The Polish 
question had been an uncomfortable one for Great Britain 
and France, because their Russian ally did not favor the 
restoration of a free end independent Poland. But the 
revolution in February and March of that year, resulting 
in the collapse of the Tsarist regime and the proclamation 
of Poland's independence by Russia gave a new meaning to 
the Polish problem. Therefore, with an ally in opposition 
to an independent Poland replaced by one friendly to her, 
Great Britain and France were free to back the restoimtion
20. Reddaway, 0£. cit.. p. 485.
21. Ibid.. p. 488.
u
of a Polish stats.
% e  oollapss of Russia and the BolshsYist paaas with tha
Oantral Powwra in Marsh, 1918, left gastam Msropa at th#
maray of Oarmany; and tha Allias, In thalr oan Intarasts,
aara eonstrainad to sat up Poland as a bsrrlar to oarman ar­
tepension. On Jamiary 8, 1918, tha British Prima Minister, 
Lloyd Oaorga, announoad support for an Indapandant Poland. 
%raa days later, tha présidant of tha United States pro- 
slaimad his Fourteen Points, of ahioh tha thirteenth da- 
olarad:
An indépendant Polish state should be arestad, ehlah 
should inolude the territories inhabited by indisput­
ably Polish populations, ehieh should be assured a 
free and secure access to the see, and whose politi­
sai and économie independence and territorial 
integrity should be guaranteed by international 
aoranant.®
After the conclusion of the Brast-Litvosk Treaty, which 
«maltted mention of provisions for an independent Poland, 
the Polish underground forces joined the western states 
against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The Paris Peace Conference opened on January 18, 1918. 
During tha next four months, Lloyd George of Great Britain, 
Clemenceau of France, and President Wilson of the United 
States debated Issues involved in the Polish problem# with
28, Ibid.. p. 488.
88. Ibid.. p. 488.
84. Ibid.. p. 489.
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re#rê to the Gemaa-Polish border, beemiee the mille# agreed 
that an Independent Poland ehonld be restored, Germany and 
Poland as well as the three Tietorioms powers held eonfllet* 
Ing vleea.
At the oonferenee, Poland aeked that the southern 
distriete of Bast Prussia, alleela and all t&f meet Prussia 
Inoluding Danzig and Posen be returned to her. The polish 
delegate maintained that slzty-elght percent of the Inhabi­
tants of Posen spoke the Polish language, and there were 
districts In Silesia and southern Bast Prussia which con- 
talned a majority of Polish nationals. Although the major- 
Ity group In West Prussia and Danzig consisted of Germans, 
both areas were historically Polish and the seaport of 
Danzig was vital to Polish economy.
Germany, receiving the conference decisions, opposed 
any decrease of her eastern border by the creation of a 
new Poland. To separate Bast Prussia apd Danzig from Ger*» 
many by the rétrocession of Meat Prussia and Danzig to 
Poland, meant a strangulation of the German Baltic pro­
vince according to the Germans. They also Insisted that 
the Polish requests contradicted the Wilsonian principle 
of self-determination.^
85. Ibid.. pp. 490-511.
|g|rlo«n ||legateg. GhspterIV, Poland(NewYork.
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Ob th® 6® 11ml tat lorn of the Oarman-Pollah border, th® 
Omltad Gtatea and Framoe differed from th® Brltlah Im polley, 
hlleoB baoked Pollah demanda to the full, and Olemwieeau, 
bellevlmg that Poland would be a bemaflolal ally to th® eaat 
of Germany, preaaed for a atrong Poland. But Lloyd Georg# 
aeeerted that eomplet® historic justice to Poland by return- 
Ing her pre-partltloa boundarlea of 1?76 m%l#Kt create a 
German Irredenta. On the question of Poaen, th® three repre- 
eentatlvea of the leading powers agreed that It should to to 
Poland* Before a solution was found, the llliea oonaented 
to the Inclusion of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
on April S8, 1919, In the Peace Treaty, which set up am 
Instrument that the negotiators depended upon for a solu­
tion of the German-Poll ah border problem. The allies de­
cided that a plebiscite In Silesia would be held since 
both Germany and Poland claimed a majority In the areas.
On June 16, 1919, the Allies and associated powers said of 
Danzig:
The population of Danzig Is and has for a long time 
been predominately German; just for this reason, It 
Is not proposed to incorporate It In Poland. But 
Danzig, when a Banza Olty, like many other Hanza
Cities, lay outside the political frontiers of 
Germany, and In union with Poland enjoyed a large 
measure of local Indepmdence and great commercial 
prosperity. It will be now replaced in a position 
similar to that which It held for so many cen­turies. 27
27. Ibid.. p. 27.
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âmâ mrnzlg «as latematiomsll under th# Leaga# ot 
Rations.
Th# preparation# for th# pl#bl#olt# lasted too years, 
and too uprising# of tha Polish population In sllaale 
finally foroad tha authorltle# to oonduot th# plablaolta 
In Marsh, 1921. Th# results proved Insonslualva, and It 
was daoldad to partition th# area. However, the first 
plan for partition only lad to a third raballlon whloh was 
quieted by forming another plan. This final arrangement 
gave Poland Important eoUlarlea, steelworks, and faotories 
but left many predominantly Polish ooal, Industrial, and 
rural sommunltles under German rule. Plablsoltes were 
also held In two contested East Prussian areas In whloh 
the Polish language predominated, taking plaoe at a 
moment when Poland was gravely endangered by Busslan In­
vasion, for the latter were near Warsaw. Moreover rever­
sing the propaganda that Poles had used In Silesia, Germany 
misrepresented Poland to the predominately Protestant last 
Prussian voters as s hotbed of Cathollo religious Intol- 
eranoe. Oonsequently, Germany won these areas.^
For the following nineteen years, East Prussia remained 
separated from the rest of Germany by the Polish oontrol
88. Reddaway, op,, olt., p. 485.
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of the Oorrldor, which Poland had gained hy the Treaty of 
Veraaillea with the addition of Poaen, and the auoeeaa of 
a plehiaeite also shifted the German-Pollah border west in 
Upper Sileaia. The settlement of the German-poliah border 
after the first World #ar on a purely hiatorioal baaia 
meeeaaitated a reviaion to the border-line of one hundred 
and fifty yeara ago in the time of Prederiok the Groat. 
Until the yirat Partition, Poland had controlled weat 
Prussia, Danzig, Poaen, and parts of Pomerania, In com- 
pariaon with the German occupation of these lands, the 
Polish period of occupation la longer by several hundred 
yeara.
When the Treaty of Versailles was signed, June 28,
1919, the negotiators did not delimit Poland's eastern 
frontier. The Supreme Oouncil of the Allied and Associa­
ted Powers established provisional eastern frontiers for 
Poland in Decmaber, however, on an ethnographie basis.
But both Poland end Russia refused to consider it binding. 
The line was called the Gurzon Line. After hostilities 
ceased, Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine signed the Peace 
Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921, by which the Polleh- 
Bissian boundary lay seventy thousand square miles east 
of the Ourson Line, The territory between the Ourson 
Line and the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga 
contained about as many Poles as there were Ukrainians
le
goamâ White ïtethealeas together. M û  W o w  end Tllme eoa- 
talned a majority of Foies. Althoa# Baeeia and Poland 
newer reoognlzed the Caraon Line as legal, it beoame an 
irritating laeue that was to arlee in eorld War II.
Part T
The border of the new. Independent Poland, «aerging 
frma the peaoe treatle# after the first world lAup, oon* 
talned two troublesome areas, the Danzig oorrldor and the 
area between the dnraon Line and Poland's eastern frontier 
reoognised by the Treaty of Riga. And Qerman and soviet 
desire to regain polish territory lost after world war I 
oaused the Fourth Partition of Poland in 1939, Eitlar 
elalmed that the oorrldor whloh separated last Prussia 
from the Fatherland rightfully belonged to Qermany, He 
based German claims on historieal possession of the Wnzig 
oorrldor sines the eighteenth oentury. And it seemed un­
natural, aooording to the Führer, that last Prussia was 
separated from Germany by Polish-held territory.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1989, Germany 
and Soviet Russia seoretly negotiated for the partition 
of Poland. Although Great Britain and Franoe endeavored 
to ally the U.S.S.B. against Qermany, Hitler's proposals
89. James Thomson ShotwelX and Max A. Laerson, Poland 
and Russia. 1919-1945 (New York, 1945), pp. 1-15.
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to BoViet iBssla promleeê her more gains them did the British 
amd Freneh aegotletore. The Qerman*8ovlet ao%&-eggreeelo* 
past, eoholuded on Mgnst 23, 1989, provided tor peaeefhl 
relations between the two for a period of ten years, eeen- 
omlo ties, and oooperetlon In foreign polley* In a aeeret 
protocol, Qermany and Soviet Rnasia agreed to the partition 
of Poland along the Plaaa, Narew, Vistula, and Ban Mvers.
Thpa, on Beptamber 1, 1989, the German armies marched
Into Poland, end sixteen daye later, soviet Russia crossed 
Poland’s eastern border with the excuse of protecting the 
Phlte Rnthenlans and Ukrainians from German aggression*
But the Fourth Partition of Poland lasted only until June 
of 1941. Because of a disagreement In the Balkans and
other problems whereby It was evident that the two coun­
tries were unable to agree on spheres of influence. Hitler 
attacked her former ally and the Fourth Partition era 
ended.
30. Great Britain, Documenta concerning German-Palish
Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between
Great Britain and deimanv 'on' Sentem^er ” ÎSSgT”
TXâCTonT'lSg'g):-------- ^ ---------------
U.S. Department of state, Documents from the 
Archives of the German Foreign Office. Na%19 Sovi ei 'leXat ions i ' .
CKAPTgR II
THE WARTIME REQOTIATIOKS AffECTIRO THE QEBMAg-POLiaB BORDER
Part I
After Hitler^ turned his war maohlae against the 
U.S.&.R. on June 22, 1941, end the Japanese fleet attacked 
Pearl Harbor, the United states, Great Britain, and soviet 
Russia informally allied In mutual defiance of German ag­
gression. "Win the war" and the "unconditional surrender 
of Germany" became the military goals.^ Bit the peace ob­
jectives were not so clear. Differences over the Polish 
question foreshadowed the complete breakdown of frontier 
agreements in peacetime. Great Britain, the soviet Union, 
and the United States were allied, but with regard to 
Poland, it was a "strange alliance."®
1* Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) started working in German 
politics in 1918. He founded the Rational socialist 
movement in Germany, 1925, which helped him attain
power in 1933 as Chancellor of Germany end Head of 
State the following ywr.
B. The decision requiring "unconditional surrender of 
Germany," to which Churchill assented, was made at 
the Casablanca Conference by Roosevelt. Robert E. 
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (Raw York, 1948), 
p.
5. John R. Deane, The stranæ Alliance (The Story of 
Our Efforts at wartime Co-operation with Russia)
(lew York, 194717^
*%
Abowt al% w##k# after the German atteek on soviet Baeeie, 
the latter Aeolared that "the soviet-German treatiee of 1#39 
relative to territorial changea In Poland" were Invalid.* 
Great Britain alao announced that aha had not reoognlaed 
any changea la Poland'a bounderlea effected alnce Anguat 
of 1959.* Soviet Buaala reveraed her poaltlon In Deeembar, 
1989, however, when Stalin * aaked for the recognition of 
the Soviet boundarlea aa they eere before the German attack 
In 1941.* A poaltlon from which the U.S.S.R. never retreated, 
the soviet claim to aeventy-two tbouaand aquere mllca of 
eastern Poland was the main cauae of the poat-war Oerman- 
Pollah border problem#
The United State# and Greet Britain had no poet war 
policy for Poland In 1941, other than the nebulous guaran­
tee of the Atlantic Charter, point two of which reads:
"They desire to see no territorial changes that do not 
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned.Although Soviet Buaala previously had agreed
4. Polish mbaaay in Washington, Polish-Soviet Relatione. 
1916*1948. Official Documents, fn. a.i. on. lôf-ltÜQ.
5. Ibid.. pp. 108-109.
Ô. Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich,(1879-1963% was one of 
the leaders of the October Revolution of 1917. As 
Marshall of the Red Army, he was promoted to 
Généralissime In 1943. He held these offices In 
Soviet Ruasla; General secretary of the Communist 
Party and President of soviet Council of Ministers.
7, william L. Heumen, Making the Peace (Poundatlon for 
Foreign Affairs* Washington, D. '6., 1980), p. 18.
8. Ibid*. pp. 19—30.
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to the prlaeiples of the Charter, she did mot oomslder the 
erpreoslon of a desire as blmdlmg; mor did Great Britain# 
Fearing a Rneeo-German ramproashment& the British oonduoted 
negotiations with the n.g.B.R# during the winter and spring 
of 1942, whloh might have oulmlneted In Britain's official 
recognition of the soviet boundary olalme, but the Onlted
gStates Insisted that territorial agreements be postponed,
By the failure of three power agremaent for Soviet Russia's
post-war annexation of eastern Poland, the spirit of the
Atlantic Charter was thus maintained.
In March, 1943, however, it was evident that Russia's
atm to keep her 1941 western boundaries had not changed.
The Foreign secretary of Grwt Britain, Anthony Bden,^^
reported to President Roosevelt^ that Prime Minister 
12slkorskl of the Polish government-in-exl1# in London 
desired the annexation of East Prussia to Poland. Under
9. Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
10. Anthony Men, Rt. Hon., (1897- ), was secretary of
state for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938, when he resigned
In protest of British appeasement to Germany. 
1940-1945, he was again secretary of State under 
Churchill.
11. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ( -1945), was president 
of the United States, 1933-1945, nominated for the
VIce-Presldency in 1920, and served as Governor of 
Hew York, 1929-1933. He published his public papers
and addressee.
12. General Wladyslaw Slkorskl, ^881-1943) was Commander- 
In-Chief of the Polish Army, 1940-1943. As Prime 
Minister of the Pollsh-exlle-Government in London,
he was noted for hie desire to compromise with the 
aussiens without becoming subservient.
IS@oa#ultatiom# Maxim Litvinov# Soviet embaeeedop to tho United 
Stetee, emnonneed that the U.s.s.a. eonld airport Poland*# 
hid for gaat Pruaaia, But hia govamwant, however, vented 
to keep the Soviet position from Polish offioiala in order 
to nae it in bargaining vith them at the peaoe table. The 
soviet# planned to beak Polish annexation of Seat Pmaaia 
in return for feoognition of the Ouraom Line. Roosevelt 
and M e n  favored Polish inoorporetion of Raet Pruaaia, but 
of Soviet aims in eastern Poland, they neither verbally 
approved nor objeoted.^^
Betveen Poland and the U.s.s.R., hovever, relation# 
grew more strained. The first territorial argument oocurred 
in January, 1948. On the 9th, the polish government informed 
the soviet Union that:
the inoluaion of Lvov among "other Ukrainian cities"
amnt be the result of a misunderstanding, for frma 
the historical point of view end from that of in* 
ternatlonal lav, end as far as the ethnological 
constitution of its population is concerned, Lvov 
vas and remains a Polish city.^®
The soviet government bluntly replied with the following 
note;
• * . , dhila finding it impossible to enter into a
13. Maxim Litvinov, 0L876- ) a Deputy People’s
Oomaissar for Foreign Affaire, he vas soviet 
Ambassador to the United States, 1941*1943.
14. Reuman, 0£. cit.. p. 81.
15. Polish fflnbassy, og,. oit.. p. £06.
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dlsousslon on the hletorloal and legal baaea on whloh 
the olty of Iwow or any other town In the terrltorlee 
of the Ukrainian 88R and the White Rnthenlan be-* 
long to the Union of soviet soolaliet lepnbllos, the 
People’s Oommlaaar deems It his duty to Inform the 
%nbaeay that In future he will not be able to aeoept 
for oonel derat Ion Motes of the Mabaaay eontalnlng 
doelaratlona of this kind.16
The tone of the note ref looted Soviet ©ont ©apt for a 
powerleee Pollah government. Regerdleae of the Pollah* 
soviet agreement of July 30» 1941, whloh abrogated the 
German-Sovlet pact of 1939, the U.88.H. did not oonelder 
the former ae binding. As an insult to Poland, aa a 
threat to her imdependenoe and territorial Integrity, the 
Soviet note dlotated terme upon whloh Polish-soviet rela­
tions were to be oonduoted. And thus, despite former 
deolaratlone to the contrary, soviet Buaala, In 1948, 
claimed her aoqulaltlona of the fourth partition.
There were other clashes during the rest of the year. 
A military agreement had provided for the formation of a 
Polish army on soviet soil to fight with the U.8.S.R. 
against Germany. In December, the Soviet government 
stopped recruitment for the Polish army on the ground 
that Poles were refusing to fight Germans. The Soviet 
implication that the Polish govermaent was pro-faaelet 
was denied, and Poland declared that her army could m t  
attack without supplies promised by the U.S.S.R.^^ The
16. Ibid.. p. 807.
17. Ibid.. pp. 186-146.
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f ml Imre to mrmmt# a Foil mb army bahlM Baaalaa llmea amd 
the peralatemt soviet éemmmolatlorn# of the Loadoa govern» 
meat provoked the Polish note of February 8b, 1943, whloh 
affirmed that: neither before the outbreak of
thle ear nor during it has the PoUeh nation ever agreed 
to any eo»operatlon elth the Germane agalnet the soviet 
U n i o n . The Pollah army had tried to eo»operate with
the U.B.8.R., and Poland repudiated the soviet "malleloue
19propaganda." The Polish Army problem never was resolved, 
and It proved to be an Irritating disagreement that strained
Polish-Soviet relations.
With regard to the boundaries, the polish note eon-
tinned:
It Is absolutely absurd to suspeet Poland of inten­
tions to base the eastern boundaries of the polish 
Republle on the pmelper and the Blaok Sea, or to Im­
pute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier 
farther to the east . . . from the moment of the eon- 
oluslon of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, 
the Polish Government has maintained . . . the status 
# o  previous to September 1, 1939, is in force; . . • 
this attitude . . .  is in conformity with the Atlantic 
Charter.
The soviet reply reasserted that the anti-soviet policy of 
the Polish govermaent advocated the "partition of the Ukrain­
ian and Blelo-Russian lands In faimur of the policy of
18. Ibid.. p. 808.
19. Ibid.. p. 208.
20. Ibid., p. 208.
«T
plimâ«rlng the Ukrainien and Bialo-Bnsaian people#; " and 
the Pole# eere violating the Atlantic Charter.
By Poland insisting on the recognition of her pre-war 
frontiers, she did not contradict the spirit of the Atlantic 
Charter. With the abrogation of the fourth partition 
treaty, Great Britain, Poland, and the Soviet Union recog* 
nlned Poland*# frontier# idilch Included Ukrainian and thite 
Bu##ian population#. By the Atlantic Charter teim#, Poland 
did not have to relinquish territory, unless it was the 
will of those within her eastern border. The Charter im­
plied that the wishes of the people concerned were to be 
expressed through a plebiscite supervised by disinterested 
parties and not held by the Soviets alone as was the ple­
biscite in Poland after the fourth partition. Until a 
plebiscite, under the auspices of the allies, could be 
held after the war, Poland's insistence on maintaining her 
1939 borders was legally correct. B»wever, the soviet 
accusations were merely a part of the policy to discredit 
a stubborn government which did not acquiesce to a diminu­
tion of Polish territories. The campaign started with the 
breakdown of Polish-Soviet military co-operation and the 
alleged Polish intentions to extend her borders to the 
Dneiper and the Black sea. And the Katyn affair was the 
next step.
61. Ibid.. pp. 208-209.
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On ##v#n different ooaaaioas between oetober, 1941, end 
Meroh, 1943, the Polleh government meked the Soviet Union 
either by note or In eonferenoe the whereaboute of fifteen 
thousand pollah off1eere oeptured In 1939. The soviet 
government replied that ell Pollah offleers bad been granted 
amnesty. But the German radio on iprll 12, 1943, announeed 
that a mass grave of ten thousand polish of fleers had been 
found near Smolensk, and the Nanis elalmed that these offl* 
eere had been killed by the Russians In 1940, shen Smolensk, 
lying east of the Ournon Line, was under Soviet eontrol.
On April 15, the soviet Informât!on Bureau In Moseow 
announeed that ”ln 1941, Polish prisoners of war w@re 
employed on fortlfleatlon work at the west of Smolensk 
where they fell Into German hands after the soviet foreea 
withdrew from that r e g ion.Oonfronted by two different 
stories, the Polish government asked the International Red 
Cross to investigate the g r a v e s . Mosoow severed relations
22. Ibid.. p. 43.
25. Ibid.. p. 129. The International Red cross rolled
that they oould not Investigate without the oonsent of
all parties oonoerned, and the Soviet Union did not
agree to the proposal. However, the U.S.S.R. seat a 
soviet oommlttee whloh plaeed the blame on the Germans. 
The members of the oommlttee were; Professor Burdenke 
(Chief surgeon of the Red Army), Chairman Alexei 
Tolstoy, Nikolay (Metropolitan of Kiev,) Lieutenant- 
General Oumdorov, Kolesnikov ( Chairman of the exeou- 
tlve of the Union of the Bed Cross and Red Cresoent 
Sooieties), Potemkin (People's Oomaissar for Muoatlon), 
General Smirnov (Chief of Medioal servioe of Red Army), 
and Mellnkov (Chairman of the anolensk Regional Kxeeu-
tlve Oommlttee). %  I6SÉS& ZlBÊH January, 19, pp. 8-7/
29
wltb th# Polish gov»rnaeat«lB-®aEil« la Loadom on April 29, 
oharging that th# Polish goTemmaat had aarar requaatad 
aa explaaetlon of the affair, and that it was eo-opsratlng 
aith Hitlarita Oarmaay "for the purpose of arastlag terri­
torial oonaassloas" from the U.ü.a.R.^
The Poles were justified la seeking an explanation, 
hut, not knowing of soYiet respoasihlllty for the Katya 
massacre, the loadoa goYammaat unwittingly forced a 
savaraace of relations. Ohurchill and Roosevelt ignored 
the issue in order to preserve a united force against 
Qarmany, Thus, not exposed through investigations, the 
soviet Union used the Katyn affair to denounce the London 
government, am action having disastrous effects for Poland. 
The rupture of relations made easier the introduction of a 
communist government into Poland and soviet domination 
there.
24. Ibid.. pp. 211-247.
25. August 1952, the House of Representatives investi­
gating committee, the Madden Committee, concluded 
that the Russians were responsible for the Katyn 
Massacre, and that the United states Administration 
during World War II bad purposely covered up the 
evidence for the soviet Union*a continued co- 
oneration in the war. (Hew York Times. December 28. 
1952, p. 1.)
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Part II
At the Teheran Conference» gtalln, Churehlll, and 
Baoaeveit agreed to the general disposition of polish 
frontiers* although an ennonnoement was not made nntll 
after the Yalta Conferenoe,*^ The Big Three decided that 
Poland's eastern frontier should follow approximately the 
Curzon Line, and the partitioned state would receive 
German territory in the north and west as compensationfce
00* &)pklns reports that in the discussion of the 
Polish frontiers, "Roosevelt took no part." 
(Sherwood, o^. cit.. p. 707.) And Hull states 
that negotiations on this question were carried 
on "largely by %urehlll and Stalin." (Cordell 
Hull, Meawirs, Æ e w  York, 104^, p. 29* j Byrmw 
says, however, that at Yalta, president Roosevelt 
spoke of his statement expressed at Teheran which 
was that the Pollsh-Russlan border would follow 
the Curzon Line, but leave Lwow and portions of 
the oil fields in Poland. (James f. Byrnes, 
Frankly ^ e w  York, 194^, p. 29.)
Stettlnlus concurs with Rymes, and both were at 
Yalta. (Edward R. Stettlnlus, Jr.. Roosevelt a M
^ e w  %rk, IR(7, 
p. 151,} Also Lane wrote; Bolotov at the Moscow 
Conference, October 9-20, 1944, informed Mikolajczyk, 
in the presence of Churchill, Eden, and Harriman, 
that the agreement for the Curzon Line was the just 
solution of the Polish frontier and Invited the three 
listeners to deny his statement if it were untrue.
The three, It la reported, sat silent. Molotov 
added that Roosevelt had preferred that his agree­
ments on this pact be kept secret." (Arthur Bliss 
Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed /Raw York, 19487* p. 50.) 
Mikolajozyk. Prime Minister of the Polish govemment- 
In-exlle In London at that time, was at the Moscow 
meeting and gives the same report as Lane. (Stanis­
lav Mikolajcgyk, Rape of Poland, pattern of soviet
Annresslon /^ew York, liî^TT p. il.)
27. See Appendix for text of Yalta protocol.
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Th# we#t#rn bouaAary *aa mat Aallaeatad, How far Polaad 
oould azpand to the north and west, the three powers did 
not speoify. The eastern border, however, as defined by 
Stalin, was definite, and It never ohanged.
soviet insistenoe on the reoognltion of the Ourson 
Line, for whioh the O.s.s.R, had persisted sinee 1941, 
eaused another Polish-Soviet oriels the month after the 
Teheran Oonferenoe. The Red Army oroaaed the Polish bor­
ders on January 6, 1944, and on that day, the London 
government appealed to her nationals "to enter into oo-
oporation with soviet oommanders in the event of resun#-
28tion of Polish-Soviet relations." In reply, the TASS
agenoy stated:
First, in the polish deolaration the question of 
the récognition of the Oimon Line as the soviet- 
Polish frontier is entirely ignored. This oan be 
interpreted only as a rejeotion of the Ourzon Line. 
Second, as regards the Polish Government's proposal 
for the opening of official negotiations between it 
and the Soviet Government, it is easy to understand 
that the Soviet Goveriment is not in a position to 
enter into official negotiations with a government 
with which diplomatic relatione have been severed.®*
And in another note, soviet Russia offered Poland compensa­
tion to her north and west in return for acceptance of the
28. stanislew Mikolajcayk, % eof soviet Annression (New York, 1948), pp. 270-872.
89. Polish Government Information Ganter, Polish FactsM  Figures. (New York, March 10, 1944 - April"'l̂ S, 5), No. 8, March 25, 1944, p. 12,
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Oar mm. Mm#, hat th# 8ovl#t govermment oontlnm#d to d##oum## 
th# Lomdom Pol##.^ Hmvimg mocured Chmrohlll*# amd 
Roosevelt*# promis#® to support th# Ourzom Lim# et th#
peaoe oomfsremo#, th# Soviet tome was obdurate#
Th# Lomdom gov#rnmemt ##k#d th# Uoit#d states amd Great
Britain to intercede, but the U.B.G.R. refused their good 
31offices# la the last of Jamuary, Churchill endeavored
33to permiad# Presiier Mlkolejozyk to agree to th# Cursom
line. Even with the promise of compensation in the north
and west, the London government remained firm and un-
yielding to Soviet pressure for Polish territory# The
govemment-ln-exile stated;
The dictatorial dmnand by the U.S.S.R# that we must 
agree in advance to the recognition of the Cursom 
Line as the future Polish frontier cannot be accepted 
by the Polish government. The result of the conver- 
estions concerning frontiers can be realized only 
after the end of the war.
However, the London Poles did compromise to strong oppo­
sition with the following proposition:
30. Mikolajozyk, o p .  cit.. pp. 207-208.
31. Ibid.. DP. 273-277. The London Times Weekly Mition.
mgrai, 1944, p. a. -------
52. Stanislew Mikolajczyk, He was wartime leader
of the Polish Peasant Party and Prime Minister of 
the Polish-government-in-exile in London, 1943-1944, 
and became Vice-Premier in the polish Provisional
Government, 1943. Between 1945 and 1947, he led 
the opposition to the Communist party in Poland, 
and in 1947, he was forced to leave for his own safety.
Di&rlag war hoatilltiaa* we ooald oonment to a demarea- 
tlom line running eaat of Vilne and Lwow. The terri­
tory weat of thia demareation line, after thia terri- 
tory is freed from German oooupation, would be taken 
over by the Polish government. The territory east of 
the dwareation line should go to the administration 
of the Soviet military authorities, with the full 
participation of representatives of all Allied powers.
But /aie/ the Polish government considéra it a duty 
to state that the intention of incorporation into the 
Soviet Union of a part of Bast pruaaia with Eonigaberg 
la against the interests of the Polish state * . . 
and restrains her free access to the sea.®®
The London government earlier had asked for the addi- 
tion of East Prussia to Poland. This had been acceptable to 
the U.8.8.B, in 1943, but again the soviet Union increased 
her demands. Even though the Polish government had con­
sented to Russian military occupation of part of the dis­
puted territory, Polish refusal to agree to the Gurzem Line 
before the Polish-Soviet meeting ended hope of réconciliation 
at that time. Without a boundary agreement, the U.S.S.R. 
refused to resume relations with the London government.
Throughout the rest of 1943, Ghurohill urged the London
government, in Parliament and la conference, to accept the
34Curzon Line. During a stormy meeting in October, 1943, 
with Churchill and Stalin, Mikolajczyk learned for the first
time that Roosevelt had agreed to the Curzon Line at
35. Mikolajczyk, 0£. cit. 209.
34. The London Times Weekly Edition. February S3, 1944,
IV, NO. 6, JUly IB, 1944, pp. 191-195.
M
f«ho3paa.®® B#*au## It was a national alaotloa year, Roosevelt 
had not eoimlttad himself publicly In 1944 and had left the 
Intlatlve to Ghurohill. In November, the United States 
announoad that she would agree to any aettlement at whloh 
Great Britain, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. a r r i v e d . Wot 
Mikolajozyk to further oppose the United States, Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union was Impossible.
Thera was also danger of a oommunlst soup d’etat.
Bisala had reoognlsed the Xublln government In July and 
at Mosoow had Insisted that she would deal only with that 
group Mikola jozyk reoommended his goverzment to eonoede
35. Mikola jozyk, olt.. p. 96.
36. Roosevelt’s equlvooal poliolas led the American Poles 
to believe that he was opposed to the Curzon Line, 
After Yalta, Mr, Rozmarek, President of the Polish- 
American Congress, said that Roosevelt would not have 
been supported by the American Poles If the elections 
had come before the Crimean Conference. (Lane, on. 
fit. « pp. 60*62.) Roosevelt told Mikolajczyk, in 
June, 1944, that the United States wcnild not go to 
war with the Soviet Union over Poland’s eastern boun­
dary, but as "arbitrator" Roosevelt would endeavor to 
retain at least Lwow and the adjacent oil fields In 
Poland. However, he never mentioned the Big Three 
agreement on the Curzon Line at Teheran.
(Mikolajczyk, op. cit., pp. 59-61.)
37. Lane, gg.* bit., p. 70.
3S. The communiât Committee of National Liberation 
originated as the "Union of Polish Patriots," 
December, 1941, at Saratov, under the leadership 
of Wanda wasllewskl, oommnlst writer. (Mikolajczyk, 
OP. clt.. p. 24.) The Soviet Union recognized the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation aa the 
Polish government, July 31, 1944.
In December, 1944, the lublln government proclaimed
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thft Omrtom Line issue* Both the polish underground and the
39London group refused however, end the premier resigned.
fhe new gowemment formed was known to be m)re anti-soviet 
40in pollop. And thus, there was no possibility of reoon-
elllstlon.
(^nfllots oontinued between the London and soviet 
governments while the ü.s.s.R. gained control of the in­
ternal affairs of Poland, By the time of Yalta, stalln 
held the same stratégie position that Tsar Alexander I 
had before the Congress of Vienna, for, at both times 
Russian armies were on Polish soil. It was the Battle of 
Warsaw that Inoreased soviet power in Poland during world 
War II. As the Bed army approaohed the Polish eapital in 
late July, 1944, the Mosoow radio broadeast an appeal for 
the Warsaw underground to rise up end fight the Germans.
The underground army attacked German divisions in Warsaw 
without allied help. From August until January, the Soviet 
army remained only six miles outside of the olty, although
Itself the Provisional Government of Liberated 
Demooratio Poland, and they were formally reoog- 
nized by the U.S.S.R., January 5, 1945. (Mikolajczyk, 
OP. clt.. pp. 72-73, 107.) At the Mosoow meeting, 
StanTslaw Bierut miggested a coalition of the London 
and Lublin governments, of whloh fourteen out of 
eighteen offices would be held by members of the 
Lublin group. (Ibid.. pp. 93-100.)
39. Lane, 2£. oit.. pp. 38-69,
40. Ibid.
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laadom end Werea# Pel## begged for e##l#tenee. Brltleh end 
Amerloen aid waa Impoealble wltheut p#mai##lon to land 
plane# on Soviet soil whloh the U.S.S.R. denied. After 
sixty-three day#, the underground oapltulated to Germany, 
and the home army was annihilated before the Red army 
eroeeed the Vistula three months l a t e r . Oonaeqnently, 
not only ea# the Soviet army In Poland bat also the under­
ground whloh might have later opposed Red oontrol wa# In- 
effestive before Yalta.
Developments shifted the emphasis from the frontiers 
question to the survival of the London government, zy the 
time of the seeond meeting of the Big Three, it was a ques­
tion of whether Poland was to beoome a soviet satellite, 
Churehlll plaeed the blame on the Polish govemment-lm- 
exlle. In his opinion, had the Poles given In to the Our-
zon Line In January, 1944, the danger from the oommnlst
4£Lublin group would never have arisen. His judgment, how­
ever, Is too harsh.
Polish stubbomess was understandable. To give up half 
of the area of Poland for undefined and possibly lesser 
portions In the north and west was undesirable, espeolally
41* Polish Government Information Center, Polish gaots 
and PI mures. (Hew York, March 10, 1944 - AprlT*W7 
Î Ü 5 Î , Mo. 10, October 10, 1944.
42. The London Times Weekly Edition. Hovcmber 1, 1944,
p. 8.
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after Soviet luesia*» further demande for half of met 
frueeia la the Konlgeberg area# Wat 11 the Moeeoe oonfer- 
eaee la Oetober, 1944, the position of the United States 
was equlvoeel. Ae long as there was a possibility that 
the United states would oppose Soviet territorial expan­
sion, the Polish goverxmeat believed in the possibility 
of a better settlement, beesuse It was not until after the 
Teheran agrewwat beoame known that Mikola jozyk urged his 
government to oompromlse# But by then It was too late.
The lublln group had been reoognlzed by the U,s#s,R, Had 
Poland kept ellent about the Katyn maeaaore, in am effort 
to remain friendly with Soviet Russia regardless of terri­
torial oonoesslons demanded, she would have had to ao- 
quleeoe to Soviet eontrol la northern Hast Prussia, loss 
half of her land, and suffer the less of the majority of
A %
her young Intelllgentla at Katyn and the Battle of Warsaw# 
For these losses, Poland was to be oompensated with an area
half the size of her forfeitures la the east. To an ethnie 
group, surviving since the eighteenth century, only by stub­
born protest, these submissions would have been Impossible 
as long as Poles had some hope of a better settlement. Had 
the London i^verment known In February, 1944, of the Big
45. The Polish underground was opposed to ceding terri­
tory east of the Gurzon Line to the Soviet Union. 
(Stanislew Mikolajczyk, T M  Rape of Poland, pattern 
BQFlet Amesslon /EewTwrk, I 9 % C  PP. Rai-Hl. j
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Three âeeleiom, it might have eeiq^romleed with soviet Rueeie
them.
It le queetlomeble, however, that the soviet Umiom would 
have reemmed relations without additional oomoeeeiooe from 
Poland, After the first slash over the Polish-soviet bor­
der in 1942, the U.S.S.R. wee det«mined to dlaeredit the 
London government and foroe a eubmisaion. soviet Bweia 
sailed the govemmemt-in-ezlle «Faesist" before the Katyn 
affair. As early aa 1942, the soviet Union had shown an 
unwillingness to oo-operate with the London government. If 
Poland had not protested the Katyn maeaaore, soviet Russia 
would have oontinued with demands until the Polish govern­
ment was subservient or foroed out by a oommunlst soup
44d*etat suoh as ooourred In Rumania after Yalta. U.S.S.R. 
wanted a ^friendly government" In Poland, and that meant
Soviet diotated oommunlsm.
The Anglo-Ameri sen polioy during the war was to keep 
allied unity against Germany at all oosts. During 1943, 
after it was known that Russia wanted eastern Poland, the 
Foreign Relations Committee in the United states senate 
rejeoted a resolution that the "Allies should seek no post­
war territorial aggrandisements. "*** The oommlttee was
44. Byrnes, ô ,. olt., pp. 52-53*
45. Arthur H. Vandenberg, % e  Private Papers of Senator 
Vandenbera (Boston, I s M ) , 52-oK '
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afraid that apposition might force the soviet Union to join 
Oermany.*^ fhe Allies were winning the war, hut Great 
Britain and the United States were losing the peace to 
Soviet imperialism#
Part III
At the Yalta Oonferenoe, convened from Pehruary 4 to 
11, 1945, the settling of the Polish question was one of 
the most Important problems. The creation of a new Polish 
government had top priority over the frontier question. Be­
cause the United States and Great Britain continued to re­
cognize the London government and the Soviet Union rejected 
that group in favor of the Lublin Poles, a new government, 
acceptable to all, had to be formed.
Aaglo-^erlcan policies for Poland compromised between 
Polish and Soviet extremes. #ile refusing to recognize 
the Lublin government, Churchill and Roosevelt wore will­
ing to form a new interim government with representatives 
of both Wndon and Lublin Poles, fhe combination made no 
difference to the U.S.S.R., if it allowed for communist 
dominance. And the ambiguous phraseology of the Yalta 
protocol that permitted the Lublin group to control the 
new Provisional government and eventually subjugate all of
4 6 .  I b i d . . p p .  5 2 - 5 3 .
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folmmâ.
The eeekaee# of $h# Imita agreement elth regarë te 
Pelend lay In the mlepleeed Anglo-Amerlearn emphmele em the 
eerde, "Imeleelem* eed "reergamieetlem.'* The United statee 
delegation urged that demeeretle leedere frwa Poland e:^ 
ahread ehonld net he juat Ineludad in tha Proelelonal 
goremeent already eetehllmhad in Poland, hut that the 
Inhlln goeemaent abould ha raorganlaad to Inelnda other 
Pollah leader# eutelde end la poland#^^ Thle line of 
reaeonlng, hoeeear, eaa Inaffeetlea to loanre equal etatua 
for both groupa In the nee government. "To reorganlne and 
Inelnda" la a vague term %%at had amny Intarpretatlona. hy 
reeogmnlng tha Inhlin group aa tha Provlalonal government 
Inataad of nalng the London Polaa aa a baala for raorganlna* 
tion, tha three poaara aoeentnated the Importanee of tha 
Inhlin government. And ahem the Inhlin government eaa re­
organized tha folloalng spring with tha inolnalwa of ii 
oretlo Pole# from Poland and abroad, the oomnumlata held 
the offlelal poaar.^
49. gdaard B. utattlnlua, Jr., Booaevalt and tha Buaelana. 
the lp*lta Oonferano# (haw lorS, ilill, pp. lll-fli.
48. Mlkolajoayk, jgg, oit.. pp. &4-B5. Thirteen out of 
the twenty-oaa offloaa were held by the Inhlin Polaa. 
The Important poaltlon# were given to the Inhlin 
group an followas Freaidanoy to gtanlalau* Bierut; 
Prime Mini atry to Maard Oaohka-Moraaakl; Plrat 
Deputy Prmnlerehlp to aladalaa Oomulka. Mlkolajenyk 
was Beooud Deputy Prmaler and Minister of igrleulture 
end inxMI Reform. (Ihld.. pp. IBl-lBB. )
41
Th# of th# matter# however, #entered @a the #1##-
tlame. heeeeee the mew Polish ProTlsioasl Qowermemt of
Matioaal Umlty was to be temporary# free eleetloas w«p#
to allow the Foies to ehoose their own govermmemt. Bit
CWrehlll mad Booeewelt failed to provide aâé#@t# maehim»
eiqr to gaaramtee the holding of Are# eleetloas. There
were only promise# whloh ebald mot be oaf oread. The faite
deelaratiom statedi
To foster the eomditioms la whloh the liberated peoples 
may exereise those rights# the three goverameats will 
jointly assist the people la any Biropeam liberated 
state or former Axis satellite state in Birop# where 
in their jadgememt eomditioms require
(a) to establish eomditioms of iateraal pease;
(b) to earry out emergemey measures for the relief 
of distressed peoples;
(e) to form interim governmental authorities broadly 
representative of all demooratio elements la the 
population and pledged to the earliest establish­
ment throng free alestions of governments respon­
sive to the w i n  of the people; and 
Id) to faeilitate where aeoessary the holding of sash 
eleetioms.
#ien# la the opinion of the three goverameats, eomdi- 
tiens la any mropean liberated state or any former 
Axis satellite state in gurope make suoh aetlon 
aeoessary to diseharge the joint reapomsibllities set forth in this deolaration. 49
yalflllmeat of Orimeaa pledges hinged on the prinoiple 
of allied unity. Only if all three powers believed aetlon 
in Poland aeeeesary, did oonditions exist for joint exeeu- 
tion of the Yalta protoool. hither Qreat Britain, Soviet
49. For text of Yalta protoool regarding Poland, See 
j^pemdlx.
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Btissla» er $h@ ¥aiteâ States ewüLd âsalare that tha polish 
sitaatioa aid mot re%mira three power assistâmes# ïïmder 
the latter olremmstamoes, the Polish Provlslomal goverm- 
m m t  was tree to eomtrol the eleetioms# % e  amhassadors 
of the three powers did mot have amthorlty to Insist that 
eleetioms he oarrled out Im a dmoeratle m m e r ,  Omly Im 
the ease of hilled oplmlom eould thc^ take set lorn im Poland, 
The Talta provisions» weakened hy hnglo-hmerlearn disregard 
for a possible breakdown of hilled eo«<^eratlon, eo#rlsed 
the polioy upon whloh #urehlll end Roosevelt plaeed their 
hopes for the estebllsWent of a free and Independent 
Poland,
%  the frontier problem, soviet Russia aohleved 
another vletory. Churehlll and Roosevelt had approved of 
the Oirnon line previously, but at Yalta they requested 
that the Polish boundary be moved east of lwow and her ad- 
jaeent oil fields# Stalin rejeoted the hnglo-hmerleam 
plan and suggested that Poland reeelve eompmsatiom for 
lwow and oil fields by expanding to the Oder and western 
Mel see Rivers# Im antlelpatlom of Polish extensive ex­
pansion to the Western Helsse, the hmerlean State Depart­
ment reeoœ&ended to Roosevelt am alternate border, 
heeordlng to the latter, Poland wuld obtain about one 
hundred miles along the Baltie Sea, Danslg, the southern 
half of last Prussia (Soviet mssla wanted the Eonlgsberg 
area), and Upper Silesia, but not as far west as the Oder
49
m â  #el@e#. Th# British plmm ##11 #4 for a lim*
alomg the Oâer im the morth but east of the Westerm Heise# 
im the south* W t h  Ghurohill amd Roosevelt believed that 
am Oder-Meiaee lime would arouse extreme Qermam irri*
itftdemtlmm* Stalim did mot imsiet upom the Oder-Heisse
however, amd, mot reaohimg a oo^romise, the three powers 
eomourred that the final dellmitatiom of the Gemam-pollsh 
border would await the peaoe treaty*
The faite Comferemoe eammot be judged apart from the 
milita]^ situât lorn at that time. The western Allies had 
mot reaohed the Rhine, but Poland and most of eastern 
Birope lay under the eontrol of the Bed am^* A few weeks 
before faite, Roosevelt told Stettimius about the atom 
b<mb although it was mot eompleted. The Amer lean delega­
tion, however, deeided mot to use its umkmowm quality to 
foree favorable deeisioms at the Grimeam Conferemee*
Ihrem thou^ the end of the war seemed near, the United 
States military staff was extrmaely anxious for Soviet 
Russia to enter the war against Japan. However, the far 
Sastern oonfliot affeoted the Polish question only im- 
direotly, for im a seeret agreement, Roosevelt eondomed 
Soviet territorial espansiom im the lUr Bast, but not im
50. Stettimius, sSL* P* 150.
51. Appendix.
52. Stettimius, og,. eit.. p. 38.
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PolmmA, far her premia# to enter the ear against Japan.^ 
Seeretarj 8tattInina summed up the Jkeerlean attitude at 
Yalta;
Am a result of the military situation, it was mot a 
question of what (kreat Britain and the United states 
would permit Bussia to do in Poland, hut what the 
two oountries oould persuade the soviet Union to 
aeoept,W
In view of the results, soviet Bussia aoeepted nothing 
unfavorahle to her. The abortive attompts of Ohurohill 
and Roosevelt to Insure a demooratio government in Poland 
were to affeot inglo-lmerioan polioy on the Oerman-Polish 
border question for the next year end a half. In oontrast 
to the agreement for the new Polish government, the western 
frontier deolaration was definite. But it was a mistake.
Had lmglo*lmeriean representatives objested to the Oder 
and Western Reisse boundary with the same firmness that 
Stalin had held to the (%rzon Line, and had they substituted 
at Yalta am alternate line to the east of the Oder*Reisse, 
the U.S.S.R. would not have produced at Potsdam the subse­
quent fait eoooffipli with respect to the border.
there were four reasons, however, for this error;
(1} Britii^ and American policies for the Qerman-Polish 
border differed; (B) #urohill and Roosevelt were more
SB. D^artmemt of State, Agaemmmmnt Regarding Japan.
1940. Executive
(Washington, D.G., 1940.}
54, Stettimius, cit.. p. 1ÔS.
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im e 4«moeratl@ Im
P@lmm4, ami, #v#m%mmlly, la Oamaay thaa Im th# boN#r
tmaatioa; (3) the t#o we#t#?a leaier# did mot eommt ®s 
the hr#mkio#m of Allied malty; (4) the Bed army oomtrolled 
Polaad*
Mo Vi a# the Oermam-Polleh border east of the soviet* 
proposed line of the Oder-Meleee before the Polish elee­
tioms, ml#t have meant the defeat of the lomdom Poles, 
who were known to be basked by Oeet Britain and the 
United states. Bmt war-time Polish-soviet relations 
should have been a warning of Soviet methods and the 
eoneeqment breakdown of Allied eo-operatlom. In whloh 
ease, avoiding the German-pollah border question until 
after the sleet lone did not aid the London poles in 
winning. However, the position of the Red army at the 
time of Yalta was probably the most important fmotor.
Great Britain and the United states had no intention of 
going to war over the Polish question.
The three and one-half years of war-time negotiations 
between the United States, soviet Russia, and Great 
Britain erposed their dlfferenees in politisai polleles, 
l^vlet Russia had two goals, the Ourson Line and an 
obedient Polish government. Polish, British, and Amerlean 
eounter suggestions were brushed aside in the soviet for­
ward drive to seoure her western border. Still believing
4$
là the evemtmel emergemee &f mm Imdmpmmdrnmt ?olmm&, the 
tfàiteâ States amd Great Britala urged territorial eem»emee* 
tlom for Pelmmd Im the north amd weat. At Yalta# It 
afaomXd have been obvloma to Ohmrohlll and Rooaevelt that 
their meemlmg of a free amd Independent Poland warn differ­
ent frma the Soviet interpretation. Bad the Anglo- 
A#erlearn delegatlonâ realised that they were leaving the 
Germam-Pollmh frontier open for the expane ion of a soviet 
satellite state, the German-Poll#h frontier qnestlom might 
have been settled at Yalta. Im exehangs for Lwow end the 
oil fields, Stalin oould have agreed to a line east of the 
Oder-Meisse.
fhe three power alllanee was a "strange alliamee,"
Mot so mmoh im the feet that there were dlfferenees among 
the allies, but It was a strange alllanee beesuse of the 
failure on the part of Ohurohill and Roosevelt to realise 
that three power unity eould not be aehieved in inter­
national affairs. Soviet Russia not only wanted to se- 
eure her borders but also to «mtemd them as mush as 
possible. While In offloe, Ohurohill never #ve up hope 
for Poland's imdependenoe, nor did Roosevelt whose
. . . polioy toward the Soviet Umiom was In the 
mature of a gigantio gamble. Mot reoognizing 
fully the Ideologloal impllestions of Marxism, 
he evidently believed that the Russians were sus- 
piolous and unco-operative largely beoause the 
western nations had first enoiroled them and 
them treated them as outcasts. He appears to 
have oonoluded that If we were to give the soviets
êf
all they waateâ, gemeremely aaâ vit haut ammr, they 
might he veemea avay tram their âaagerous ideas at 
voria revolmtion mad oe*operate vholehearteâly ia 
the eammom emterprise at haildiag a better t&mrrawé 
le vas eager to meet the aoviet leaders amd talk 
things over vith them, for he was ooafident that 
the foree of his personality, ommhined vith the 
poverfnl position of the laited states, would sense 
them to he more reasoaahle.»®
Bat the hopes of Yalta were shattered before the third
meeting of the three powers at Potsdam.
©6. Thomas A. Bailey, Ameriem.Ayaoes Bnsaia; Ruaalan--
OgaPTXR III
1PII1E jBKIIQWIR jJKI) "TiaaE BüBWUÜKüDOlOt <)]P j&JJL,I]BD inirMT
la hi# 8tat# Qf the Umlom mddr###, om Jenamry #, 1945,
Preeidemt Boo##vel% obeerved that "the a#arer we some te 
waaqaiehim# ear eaeaiee, the mere we iaewitmhly beeome coa- 
eelem# ef dlffereaee# emeag the wieter#,"^ tithia tee year# 
of laita, the ameeapreml#ia& aad divergeât pelieie# of the
aille# destroyed their post-war amity ia the eettlemeat of 
Germaa mad Polish affairs* Pelaad, the last of the liber­
ated states to hold "free sad aafottered eleetioms," 
yielded to eosaamalat pressare* Qermamy beeame a paws be- 
tweea %a#t mad West, sad a pesos treaty with her seemed 
remote ia Jaaaary, 1949. the hrsaMowa of fear power 00- 
operatlom ia oarryiag out the lalta sad Potsdam agreememts 
om Germamy mad Polaad led to a ohamge ia the poll oies of 
the Gaited States aad Great Britaia* lad laglo-imerioaa 
reluotaat aoquiesoeaoe oa the Oder-Heisae lime was replaoed 
ia the fall of 1946 with a polioy of aoa-eooeptaaee.
Ia July, 1945, the Oder aad westera Neisse Rivers 
formed the Germam-Polish border. Gailatorally, the soviet
I. (0,8. ) Departmemt of State, Departmeat of State
M I s S M *
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Omlem $r#m«f#rr#4, b#f@r# Po%#4em, territory emmt of the
Oâer-Heiese to Polish eamlmletrmtlorn* 8tella etete* that 
the Oermaae had fled before the advaaee of the Baaalam 
aray, aad that the area was without a govemmeat. Olalm* 
lag that the rear lines of the Red army needed protestloa, 
the 9*8,8.R, gave thirty-aiae thousand square miles of 
Germany to Polaad, At Potsdam however, the Polish repre­
sentatives admitted that at least one and a half million 
Germans still remained east of the Oder-Relsse, a mmber 
large enough to form a goveiment to maintain order. Bat 
Poles from east of the Garaoa H a #  were moving la aad 
pushing Germans out. By transferring Poles westward, the 
80Viet Galon aad Poland iaformally fired the German-Pollah 
border at the Oder-lelsse,®
The placing of German territory under Polish adminis­
trât lorn without Big Three consultation eontradloted the 
spirit of Allied unity. For the same military reasons that 
had governed the Yalta Gonferenoe, however, Great Britain 
aad the Gnlted states were in no position at Potsdam to 
oppose Soviet polioy for Poland. Although the three powers 
reaffirmed that the final delimitation of the German- 
Pollsh border imld await the pease settlement, they 
approved of Polish admlnistratlom la the following area:
. . . the former German territories east of a line
ruaalng from the Baltio sea immediately west of
R, Byrnes, o£. alt,, pp. 79-81,
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aad thmia# along the Oder River to the 
eemflaeae# of the «estera Relsee to the Ozeehoelovek
frontier, imolmdlmg that portion of Rest Pmeela met 
plaeed mmder the administration of the Union of 
Soviet Soeialiet Repahlio# in aeeordaaee with the 
aaderetandimg reaehed at this eonferenee and la- - 
elndlng the area of the former free Oity of Dannig.
It was a soviet fait aeeomoli. Great Britain and the United
States did not favor Polish eontrol as far west as the Oder-
Beieae, hut they were powerless to effeetively oppose it
without going to war. And the West would net eonslder war
heeause of the Germam-Polish border issue alone.
The Oder-Beisse line was not permanent teehnieally.
But Artiele M i l  nullified the foree of that provision by
stating:
The three governments having eonsidered the question 
in all its aspeets, reeognine that the transfer to 
Qeranny of German populations, or elements thereof, 
remaining in Poland, Oneohoslovakla and Hungary, will 
have to be undertaken. They agree that eigr transfer 
that takes plaoe should be effeoted in an orderly 
and humane lumner.d
Poland intex^reted the above artiele as taoit permission to
expand into end expel Germans from uMesignated areas to
her mrth and west. Immediately, she started removimg
Germane mot only from pre-war Poland but also from German
territory under her administration. Maintaining that the
Big %ree would have provided for Qeiman displaemaents from
areas that were to remain German, Poland deolared that Great
5, See Appendix.
4, Ibid.
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Britaia a M  the Baited State# ladireetly eupported the Oder- 
Beiese lime at Petadam.
Dariag the year after Potadam, the Baited State#, Oreat 
Britaia, aad Eraaee did mot opealy object to the Gerama- 
Polish border at the Oder-Keisse. They erea laetraeted 
their embaeaiee ia Warsaw to iaalat that deportatioa of
Germaae be effeoted la the moat humaaltarlaa maaaer
spossible. The Allied Ooatrol Oouaell ia aeeordaaee with
the Potsdam Deelaratloa, permitted the transfer of sevea
millloa Qermaa-speahiag people from eastern Barope to the
fomr zones ia Germamy. Aad seeretary of state Byme*^
said; «The set tirent agreed at Potsdam requires the
shifting of boaadariea la the Bast, aad the movmient of
several million Germans from other eouatriea.*^
Bat at the Oouaell of Poreiga Ministers ia July, 19#,
the freaoh foreign minister more aoourately expressed the
situation aad tersely remarked as follows:
The Potsdam ooaferenoe made agreements with rasp eat 
to eastern Germany, whioh were provisional in pria- 
eiple, but in fast were fundamental, and with whioh
5, Lane, gg,. Oit.. pp. 1B6-S&7.
d* James Prenais Byrnes (1879- ) was Seoretary of
State, 1946-1947. He served as Assooiate Justioe 
of Supreme Ck»urt between 1941 and 1942, and later, 
he beeame Bireotor of loonomie Stabilisation, 1942- 
1943, and Bireotor of Offloe of War Mobilisation, 
1943-1946. He published, apeaking ireaklr.
7. Byrnes, an* oit.. p. 89.
the Wxemh gav#rom#mt é%â mt take leme.^
The applleatloa of the ?ot#4em provleioa# to the tramefer-
erne# of Gemaas made the tea^orary frontier final, the
three powers woold not have allowed Poland to expel mllliona
of Oermana east of the Oder-Keisse Rivera if the area was to
remain German#
Thna, Great Britain and the United states aoeepted
defeat at Potsdam hot not willingly. Daring the same eoam*
oil meeting, British foreign minister Bevin® stated:
. . . one of my first enperienoee, • « • was to find 
myself In that Oahinet where I had to aeoede to a 
new Polish frontier whioh I have never yet heen ahle
to reeonoile with the Atlantia Charter, hut whioh 
the very neoessities of war at that time eompelled 
me to agree to.**
The Big Three did not formally agree oa a final border. But
Bavin meant that beoause of Artiele H I  I, the area plaoed
under Polish administration was to go to Poland at the peaee 
eonferenee. #  whioh prooedure, the German-Polish border 
would then follow the Oder and Western Heiese Rivers. Soviet 
Russia aehieved her goal at Potsdam for whioh she had been
8. (U.S.) Department of State, ponomje. Polioy 
toward Germany. European series 15, Publioation 
iéii (Washis^on, 1945), p. 32.
9. Be Via (1861* ) had been in polities and a trade
union official sines 1929. He was Great Britain's
Seoretary of state For Foreign Affairs, 1945-1947.
10. (U.S.) Department of State, Oooupation of Germny.
Policy and Pronress Ruropeen gerles 3hTlpuhiiea#ion 
IfifrAttgust 1 W 7  Pp. 225-228. ÎU11 text of 
speech is given.
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pressing sinse the Crimean meeting, âmû Great Britain and 
the United States admitted as mieh during the following 
year.
The hreekdown of allied unity la Germany and the 
failure of the polish Provisional government to oarry 
out the Yalta and Potsdam pledges, directly affooted the 
Geman-Pollsh border question. By not formally recog­
nizing the final delimitation of the frontier, the lost 
held a political weapon. And In the fall of 194Ô, thi^ 
reversed their policies. In an attempt to thwart soviet 
eclipse of Germany and Poland, Anglo-American policies 
became firmer; the West threatened not to recognize the 
Oder-Heisse line at the peace conference.
Two main factors caused the collapse of Inter-Allied
control of Germany: the disagreement on German reparations
and the subsequent failure to treat Germany am an economic
unit. At Yalta, the United states and the soviet Union
agreed on twenty billion dollars, fifty per cent of which
would go to soviet ihissla, as a "basis for discussion" for
11German reparations. The meeting of the reparations com­
mission in Moscow ended in an impasse. Soviet Russia 
maintained that twenty billion dollars was the repara­
tions fi#ire and not a basis for discussion.
At Potsdam, however, the three powers decided on the
11. See Appendix for text of Yalta Agrafent.
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of roparatiom# is the form of Gormen *e##t# abroad
and removal of capital ladumtrial equipment not neoeaaary
12for the peacetime economy of Germany,* Becanee the fotadam 
agreement alao baaed reparation# in the form of capital in- 
dnatrlal equipment in relation to her peacetime economy, 
the poeaibility of placing reparation# on a dollar baaia 
vaa anperceded by the later agreement. Yet throughout 1946, 
the Soviets argued that the United States had agreed at 
Yalta to the figure of twenty billion dollar# a# final in­
stead of as a baaia for discussion. Therefore, the U.s.s.R, 
believed ahe was entitled to eract reparation# from German 
exports to make up the deficit not reached through the 
value of capital industrial equipment and external assets}® 
The Soviet position proved detrimental not only to 
Germany but also to the occupying powers. Germany re­
quired isqiorts of food and other essentials to sustain a 
healthy standard of living and meet the casts of the 
occupying forces. Because all German external assets were 
eamarked for reparation, end the looted gold uncovered in 
Germany had to be restored to the countries from which It 
had been taken, exports based on current production were 
the only means whereby Germany could be self-supporting.
IS. See #pendix for text of Potsdam Agreement.
13. dJ.S, ) Impartaient of State, Occupation of Germany. 
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M t  %t the soviet# took exporte for reparations» the West 
vooXâ have to flnanee German Importa. InâlreotXy# the^ 
ivomld he paying Germany*a reparation bill, for these 
reasons» the Western powers Insisted that the Potsdam rape* 
Mtlon plan he earrled ont#^*
%rongWmt the next year, the oeonpylng powers failed 
to aehleve a eommon polioy regarding German Imports and 
e;qport8. fhere was no way to oheek the Soviets taking 
German exports as reparations, heeause the U.s.s.H. 
elosed her none to foreign observers, without allied 
unity In Germany, unilateral motion of one power meant 
not only li^edlmemt to Germany*# reoovery, hut also ex­
pense to the other powers. If unifioatlon failed to 
emerge, the West had no alternative but to join their 
xones.
At Paris, the foreign ministers dlsoussed German 
Issues. Seoretary Byrnes presented a draft, on April 29, 
for a twenty-five year demilitarization of Germany to be 
guaranteed the four powers. He had suggested this Idea 
to Molotov^^ at the London Meeting in September. Curing a 
dissuasion with Stalin, In Deoember, J^ymes thought the
14. Ibid.. pp. 34-3Ô.
15. Voyeheslav Mikhailovioh Molotov, (1390- ) was
the People’s Commissar for foreign Affairs, 1939- 
1945. He was a Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet 
Union and Foreign Minister between 1945 and 1949.
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favored the pXaa. mt at Parle, Molotov re* 
jeeted the *rlttem draft heeause it did mot provide for 
Germam disarmament and demllitmrimatiom. Molotov was in* 
eorreet, however, the Byrnes* draft even went farther, 
by establishing a four-power oommiaaion with authority to 
investigate eaeh zone. This eonmiasion, of oourse, would 
have broken down the barriers between the zones and sup­
plied the Oontrol Counoil with information regarding 
reparations removals from eaeh zone. The Soviets did 
not aooept the dmeriean Draft Treaty, and Byrnes warned 
that reparations from the U.8. zone to the Soviet Dniom 
would stop if German eoonomio unity failed. Beeeiving 
no reply, the Amerloan zone temporarily halted deliveries 
to the U.G.8.B.1*
After the members reoonvened for the second half of 
the Paris Gonferenoe, Molotov attaoked western polioy.
His denunciations were unique. Disregarding the previous­
ly discussed issues, he struck at the three powers with 
new points. Molotov elaimed; the West wanted to create 
an agrarian state of Germany; the West caused failure of 
the reparations settlement; the West refused to plaoe the 
Ruhr under four-power oontrol whioh meant that France,
Great Britain, and the Dnited States would deprive Gemany
. teact of the Draft Treaty see: (U.S.)Id. Wot full  
Department 
Vol. HV, pp. 816-Sld,
5?
9f ttiis basis witbimt a plebiealte. With a fimal strake,
IfôlotOT predieted that sattlemamt os a Qemas peaee treaty
ifvas mot is the sear future*
Molotov made it apparest that the rift had videsad 
betveem last amd West. After months of negotiations, there 
was so agreement oa the reparations for Qermmny. The west 
had no intention of allowing four-power eontrol of the 
Buhr when they were even forbidden information oonoerning 
the soviet none. And the West publioly objeeted to dis­
memberment of the Buhr from Germany.^® It was notieeeble 
that Molotov did not suggest a plebisoite for the eastern 
German border as he had for the Buhr.
Allied unity in Germany did not oonoern the U.S.S.R.
The following day, the United States offered to marge her 
zone with any or all of the other zones. Great Britain 
aooepted, and the two treated their zones as one eoonomio 
unit as of January 1, 194?. franoe joined later in the 
year.^®
On the other side of the Germas-Pollsh border, the
1?. Vital meeohes o£ the ̂  {New York, 195#), Vol.
r o n  No. , AugusTTrîs^ô, pp. 020-022.
18. (U.S.) Department of atete, Oooupation of Germany. 
Polioy end Progress, European series BSTPubiioa- 
tiott #783, August, 1947.
19. (U.S.) Department of state. Department of state 
Bulletin. Vol. XV, No. 389, Publioation #7^^ 
Deoe^er 15, 1945.
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Poll#h ProTlsloMl (bv#r«m#a% of Hatloaal Baity failed to
oarry out the Potodam eommltmwmte. Vith regard to aleo-
tloaa, the potadam deelaratloa statedî
• . . the Polish Provisioaal Oovemmeat la aeeordaaee 
with the deolsloaa of the Orlmea eonferenee has agreed 
to the holding of free aad unfettered eleetloae as 
s ^ m  as possible om the basis of universal suffrage 
and seeret ballot ia whioh all demoeratie parties 
shall have the right to take part aad to put forward 
eaadidates, aad that représentative# of the Allied 
press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the 
tmrld upon developments ia Poland before amd during 
the eleotions.%0
Regardless of her Potsdam pledge, Poland did mot hold eleo-
tlons for a year and a half.
The Poles as well as their oommuaist-oontrolled Provi*
sional government regarded Artiele XLtl of the Berlin
Deelaratloa as aa admission that the Oder^Reisse line was 
final. All of the Polish politisai parties basked that
line as just eoi^ensatioa for Poland*# eastern loss. Amd 
her attitude iaflueaoed Western polioy on the Germam- 
Polish border. Great Britain aad the Baited states re­
frained from asserting that the Oder-Neisse was not final,
until it was obvious that Poland was a soviet satellite.
B1By April 1940, Ameriean Ambassador lane was eon- 
viaoed that the Polii^ Provisional government was totali-
BO. See Appendix for Potsdam text,
ai. Arthur Bliss Lane (1894- } has been in the Baited
States Diplomatio service since 1910. B. 8. 
Ambassador to Warsaw, 1945-1947. He published:
I ÊSS, W m â  mJjMSÈ*
if
tari#a. 8&a@« tbe United State» aad Polaad had
been me&otletiag for an eooaomio treaty amd the extenalom
of Amerloam oredlt to Poland. Lane opposed the treaty.
An ezohaage of notes on April Ad, 1946, broa#t to oomoln* 
elon negot let Iona for the art melon by the gxport-Import 
Bank of limited oredlt of forty million dollars to Poland,
Again, lane protested with the following note:
V h m  the terroristic activities of the security Police 
came to an end, when freedom of the press ia restored, 
and when American citizens are released from Polish 
prisons— not until then should the United states* 
publie funds be used to assist the Polish Provisional 
Government of Rational Unity.M
Because of Lane*s reports, Poland pledged that ahe would
uphold the Yalta and Potsdam agreements with respect to
elections. Poland promised to hold thmn in 1946, grant
freedom of press, and respect the rights of American
citizens. Conditions did not change, however, because 
the Provisional government maintained that it had never 
broken the Yalta end Potsdam agreements in the first 
place.^
On June 30, 1946, Poland held a referendum. It was 
a trial run by the #cvernment to ascertain whether the 
cmamunist party would win in the coming elections, fhe 
British, French, and American kmbassies concluded before
22. Lane, gp,. cit.. p. 237. 
83. Ibid.. p. 240.
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the vétlmg that the Pelleh Peaeamt party, the only opposi­
tion to the Gommnmist party, eonld not win, slthongh it 
represented ei#ty per oent of the eleetorete. Dnring 
the pre-eleetlon eesvelgnlng, the government hloeked the 
Polish Peasant Party from omapaigning on equal basis with 
other parties. The polios imprisoned members of the large 
party and intimidated the population. By the time of the 
refermdum, there was no doubt which party the Provisional 
government favored. After the election, the government did 
not open the ballot boxes in the presence of representatives 
of all parties as was prescribed by law. The commnist 
party claimed an overwhelming victory, although it was es­
timated that they had been supported by less than twenty 
per cent of the electorate.®^
After the referendum, Poland told the West that elec­
tions could not be held until the following spring. Know­
ing that the people did not support the government, the 
ccmmmnist party wanted chance to gain better contml of 
the population. The Soviet Union clandestinely backed 
the Provisional government. ^  this time, it was evident 
that there was no accord in the policies of the four powers 
in Poland and Germmny.
A few weeks later. Bavin said of the polish frontier*
We see no reason why we should finally rati# the
2 4  I b i d . ,  p )  2 4 0 .
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a«88ioa of tbiB “rast territory to Poland without 
helmg aatlafled that thoae aaauramoea {of Potsdam) 
have heea fully carried out. we should also wish 
to he assured that the Poles would he ahle to 
develop this territory so that the eoonomio re* 
souroes were properly used end that It did not 
heoome a wilderness from whioh Germans had heen 
emoluded hut whioh the Poles would he unable to 
populate.®®
The mote was a warning to Poland. Unless she held free 
eleotlons and permitted other freedtms, the United Kingdom 
did not feel obligated to support the oder*Nelsse line at 
the peaee eonferenee.
Ând on 8^t«mber 1946, Byrnes also deolared a 
ehange In Amerloan polioy. For the first time sines 
Potsdam, Bymes announoed that the final delimitation 
of the frontier should await the German peaee eonferenee. 
The epeelflo statement that the United states would sup* 
port at the peaee settlement soviet proposals tor the 
transfer to the U.s.s.B. of lonlgsherg and adjacent areas, 
mphaslzes the (mission of any promise to support the 
Oder-Helsse line.®®
The speeehes representing the poll el as of the United 
states and Great Britain were directed to the Soviet Union 
and the Polish Provisional government. Anglo*mer 1 earn 
reAisal to reeognlne the Oder*Helsse line heeause of
Mew fork Times. JUly 26, 1946, p. 1.
26. (U.S.) Department of State, Departmeat of state
Bulletin. Vol. m i ,  Mo. 547, puhlloatlon 2470, 
September, 1946, pp. 249*251.
to me#t WQtwém #ho*ed #
TOVMplag of poll ole## from that of euhmloelom to the
Potsdam fait aooomoli to one of open moe-aeoeptemee.
Their poeltloa m »  week, hot Gezmame end Pole# did mot
take the threat lightly.
Tloe Preeldemt Oomolka^^ aaealled lyraes for hariag
the "amdaelty" to give the Oermama amy hope of frostier
retleloma. Alao, he said that four mllllom Pole# moved
Imto the territory amd vithim a fee momthe there eomld he 
#8five mllllom. Peaeamt party leader# Mikolalozyk#
opposed Byrmee* polioy. The day after the Stuttgart
speeoh# Poles held a mass meeting hefore the imerloam
goMhaeey Im Warsaw Im protest of Amerloem polioy.
With Soviet haoklmg, Poland opposed the West with
sofirmmess. On September 21, President Boleslae Biermt 
Indireotly referred to a Polihh-Sovlet agremmint on the 
border question. He said that he
27. Wladyslaw Ommlka ( ) mmber of the polish
Workers* Party# he was the first Deputy Minister 
of the Polish Government of National ïïslty. Be­
longs to the (^mmist Party.
28. New York Times. September 9# 1946# p. 10.
29. New fork Times. September 6# 1946, p. 26.
30. Boleslaw Blerut (1892- ) Assisted reorganising
the National Ckmnoil in Poland in 1943. He was 
eleoted President la 1944# president of the polish 
Provisional Government, and President of the polish 
Government in 1947. He Is affiliated with the 
oommunlty party.
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, . • uaâersteaâ the mote of «##ethy emong
the Aliies toward Germmay. If there are pelitieiem#
who think they earn make ehmmges Im Polaad, they are 
wrong,or suoh a plsm womld have eatastrophie re- 
suit8*^*
fhe address, at Katowioe of the Polish premier Üward B* 
Osmhka-Morawski,^^ was mere reweallmg: "Gemeralissimo
Stalim told us that those who wish to W&ake our westers 
frontiers, whioh were set at Potsdam, would mot only have 
to deal with the Polish army but also the Bed srmy."^ 
fh» Vest, for the seoomd time, thought there was a 
Polish-Soviet treaty on the Qermssfpolish frontier, Im 
April 1945, the Department of state notified the soviet 
governmemt it reoeived press and radio reports that ear- 
tain soviet-oosupied territories, imoludimg Dammig, had 
been formally inoorporated imto Poland, fhe replies were 
not speeifio.^ The w p y  of a Polish-Soviet treaty, re­
leased to the Ameriean asd»assador at Moseow in mreh 1945,
reveals that only the Curmon M m e  was formally agreed 
35to. But the Osubka-Morawski statement made it oleer 
that Poland and the U.s.s.R. reaehed agreement on the
31. New York Times. September 2 1 ,  1 9 4 6 ,  p. 5.
32. Edward B. Osubka-Morawski, member of P olish  Communist
P arty  and P o lish  Prem ier.
33. Mew fork Times. Oetober 13, 1946, p .  4 .
34. lane, 0£. alt.. p. 249.
35. (U.S.) Department of state, DeparWent of state Bulletin. Vol. XLY, Ho. 348,^uSîîoâlTon 2ÎfS, 
m r o M T  1945, pp. 340-341.
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w&at9m border# Aewrdlmg to Byrmee, a Polleh-Bovlet 
Treaty #a# elgmed on Angnat Id# 1948, by whioh the Soviet 
Union and her eatelllte reoognlmed the Oder-helaee a# 
final.^ With the Soviet Union banking Poland, Anglo- 
Ameriean threat# of non*reoognition held little vei^t in 
Warsaw.
Bnt on the other side of the border, Qerman reaction 
favored western polioy, A few days after the Stuttgart 
speech, certain German# urged the people to petition the 
Allied miitary government toward restitution of pre-war 
boundaries between Germany and Poland. Although the 
Soviet censor in the U.s.s.h, some of Berlin refused 
favorable commentary in the paper, "Weue Belt," leaders 
in other zones urged that territory east of the Oder- 
Helsse be returned to Germany.
One of the purposes of Byrnes* speech was to simke 
out Soviet attitude on the eve of elections In frraoh 
and British zones. Previously, the soviet government 
had baited Germans with possible return of former terri­
tories under tm#orary Polish administration. At the 
same time, etmuanists In Poland promised Poles a perman­
ent border along the Oder-Helsse. However, the American
3#. Byrnes, og,. cit.. pp. 191-2.
87. Hew fork Times. September 8# 1946, p. 11,
##
Bt&tmmmt finally #v0keé a reply from Molotov. He took 
Poland*B aide, W t  aignifioantly emoo# delayed until 
German eleotlons were over.^
flie result of these eleotlons showed eommunist par­
ties reoeiving less than tea per oent of the votes 
Soviet polioy on the frontier question had weakened her 
position in Germny. Although the Soviets delayed an- 
nminoements# the daamige had already been eaueed by Osubka- 
Morawski *s statement of Stalin's promise to bank the Oder- 
Heisse line with foroe if neoessary. By the end of the 
year, all of the zones held eleotlons. Sxoept for the 
Soviet zone and Berlin, the oommmist vote was less than 
tea per oent in the rest of Germany. In oontrast to their 
weakness In western zones, the oommunists doubled their 
pereeatage to twenty per oent of the electorate la Berlin, 
but that was m t  enough to win oontrol. And in the soviet
40zone, the sommaists slaimed eighty per oent of the vote.
During Hovember, 194@, the Provisional government 
aosused the Polish Peasant Party of so-operating with 
"Passist" countries who had denied Poland her western
38. lane, on sit., p. 253. 
39. (U.S.) Department of State, Oooupation of Germany,Policy and Progress. 1946-194%, mropean series S3, 
Pubiioaiîon %7iS, August 1947, pp. 57-68.
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territory.*^ M m  thowgh thl# party had objwteé to lyraes*
#pa#@h amd had ampportad th# Oder*B#laa@ lima alma# Yalta,
aamaamlat leadara aallad it pro-fasoiat. Beaamaa of almi-
lay attaaka, jmbaaaador Lama raammaamdad that the limited
Btataa ramaim allant on the frontier queatiom until after
Poli ah alaatloma. Lama* a omammniqme read;
Umlaaa we are prepared to maa phyaiaal foree, we 
eanmot onilaterally ehange the frontier, and ©nr 
eapomaal of the thesis (whioh wee implied if not
aetmally erpresaed im lyraes* Stuttgart speeoh> 
that the western frontiers were not to he permamem*
tly Polish made a universally had impression ImPoland,4*
Although the United States did suffer a severe eethaok with 
respeet to prestige im Poland, she gained favor im Germany, 
It was obvious that eommunlsta eontrolled Poland, and 
therefore, the lest did not influenoe the eleetiom re­
sults# But in western zones of Germany, Great Britain, 
the United States, and Erenoe permitted all parties to 
equally partioipate in the oempaigos and voting. Irri­
tated by soviet eclipse of Poland and East Germany, the 
West determined to prevent this in Western Germany,
On Jemuary 17, 1947, the ommunlst party proclaimed
a sweeping victory im the Polish eleotlons.^ The hopes 
for the rise of a free amd independent Poland expressed
41, Lame, oit,. pp. gd3-g65.
42# iMJLâ." » pp, 863—265,
43. Poland of Today. Vol. 8, Ko. 3, March 1947.
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in th# provlmloa of Yalta and Potadam war# obaolate, Thar# 
vaa mo reaaom amy lomger for aaglo-Amer loam polioy to plao# 
Poland over amd above Germany. Im th# praotleal aemae, 
Poland #%lated as a satellite. Th# soviet ooura# for Poland, 
aimo# the early part of the war, was an mndeviatlmg path 
toward domination. Had Roosevelt and oWrohlll realized 
Soviet Basai#*# alma and ommamlatlo methods for takln# 
over a government, the border mlggit have been settlirà east 
of the Oder-Helsse In exohang# for reoognltlon of the 
dirzon Line. At Potsdam, It was too late; Greet Britain 
and the United states lost the bargaining power of th#
Ourzon Line by oonoeding to it during the war. Poland 
n^ved in under the ausplees of the 0.S.S.B., and Western 
powers saved fee# by agreeing only indireotly to the Oder- 
Helsse line, whioh polioy they used later to th# advantage.
In l#4d, the Polish provisional Government of Katlonal 
Hnity failed to abide with the Potsdam deolaratlon for 
Poland; the Soviet Onion broke the Potsdam pledge by 
basking the Pi%visional government; Allied unity broke 
down in Germany. And this was the part of the Cold War 
that oaused the oriels of the Qerman-Follsh frontier. In 
war, there is no willing oompromise or aequlesoenoe, 
whether It be a politisai or military oonfliot. And aa 
the West revamped their polloiea to prevent the fall of 
th# Iron Curtain over Germany, they used every devise 
possible. Among them was the German-polish border question.
CBAPTm IV
BORDER AMD THE FAIUORE TO WRITE A <»HMAM PEAGE TREATY
Be@@m#e it was am establlshad fact by februaiy 1947» 
that Polsmd lay wlthlm the soviet orbit, there was mo 
reason for the West to soft-pedal Oermsm-Polish frontier 
questions. Diplomatio slashes ooourred throughout the 
year, and by Deeember, ne^tietions reached an impasse. 
Without four-power agreement, it was impossible to stop 
Poland from oooupying and olaiming territories to the 
Oder-Melsse; and without a German peace treaty, the west 
refused to recognize the border as final. lOur years 
later, Eastern and western opinion remained the same, 
negotiations failed, and there was no settlement.
The growing &mst-west dispute did not intimidate 
the new Polish government. Poland maintained she had 
recovered land that belonged to her. After his inaugur­
ation, February, 1947, President Blerut appointed a cw&- 
mlseloner for the "Recovered Territories,"^ ] ^ r  million 
Poles lived there. Of Western insistence for border 
changes, he stated:
. . . such a revision wuld result in unhappy, not 
to say dangerous consequences. Millions of people 
would have to move agmim— some of thma already have
1. Poland of Today. Vol. II, Ho. S, March 1947, p.8.
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&##m mvmâ two, three, end «vem t m r  tlmee âuriag 
the peet greare— aisâ aerioms pelltleei mpheavale 
mmXÛ be oertala to follow . . .
Wqt all praotleal purposes the ease we# eloseâ #*• 
eept for the final teehaleallty of legallzlag this 
horëer settlement by the term# of e peaee treaty*®
A Iféf ehange we# mot only infeasible, bet also pole#
âeolareâ the border settled at Potsdam. The new Polish
gowemm#nt reasoned a# follows*
* • * the problem of the Pollsh-Gersen border doe# 
not await a solution, for one has already been
agreed upon, The solution, moreover, had been 
Implemented by plaolng the former German terri­
tories east of the Oder-lelsse line under Polish 
administration and by removimg the German Inhabi­
tants. Whoever advosate# any ehange In the pre­
sent settlement thereby advosate# the revision 
of am already established frontier.*
Poland oonslstently followed this position the mart four
yeers.^
To warn the more powerful West of serious eonsequeneee 
arising from border revisions wuld have been fcwlhardy by 
Poland without assuranoe of outside help. But obviously, 
the ÏÏ.8.S.B. basked the Polish eommnlst party. In his 
Inaugural address, President Blerut thanked the govlet 
tJnlon for her neighborly aid throughout 194i. In April, 
the Polish i^vernment announoed*
B* Ibid*# p. 5*
B* ,i]C|bld* , PP* S—6*
4. Ibid., 1947-1961.
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. . * It 1# easy to imâeratamd wtoy the mew Poll# 
Premier made the eepltel of the Soviet tlalom the 
#eal of his first trip abroad, A stromg amd laetlmg 
frlemdehlp blmds polamd amd Soviet Rmssla together.
. , Polamd • . , is still hammted by the fear of re* 
mewed Germam aggreealom, amd her frlemdehlp with the 
Soviet Gmlom appears to her the best gmaramtee amd 
proteetiom agalmst this dsmger.®
There was mo seeret, Polamd amd the G.S.s.R, were bommd im
elose frlemdship, amd polamd feared Germam irrldemtlam.
By Imsletlmg that the Big Three, at Potsdam, Imtemded
the Oder*Heisse lime as the future border, Polamd wms 
oorreot. m t  Imtemtloms are mot gsaramtees, amd the 
Umlted states amd Great Britaia were free to support what­
ever fromtler they desired at the peaee oomferemee. Byrmes*
threat amd the approval whioh it reoeived im Qermamy eaueed 
Polish warmlmgs of the firmmess amd foroe of soviet support.
Amglo-Amerlearn polioy revlsioms, the last half of 194S, did 
mot push Polamd toward the soviet Bmiom. Polamd was al­
ready there. lUt Westarm polioy gave her a ohoioe: either
fulfill Potsdam pledges with regard to eleotloms amd wlm 
Westarm frlemdship also, or Igmore agreememts amd fees 
Westarm oppositlom. Polamd took the latter oourse.
Im the sprimg, the foreigm mimlsters of Pramoe, Great 
Brltalm, the Soviet Gmlom, amd the timlted states met Im
5. polamd of Today. Vol. II, No. 4, April, 194?, p. 16.
n
Mofldov* Marshall^ elaborated om %rmee* state*
meat and proposed the following;
. . . southern last Prussia should heoome Polish 
territory. Germn Upper Silesia end its industrial 
oo^plex should also heoome Polish, hut there should 
be land available to help sustain the eoonony of 
mrope. The division of the remaining territory, 
whioh is largely agrioulturel land, required eon* 
sidération of the meeds of the Polish and German 
peoples and of Birope ms a whole.
Im order for million people to live in reduoed
Germny, ahe will have to heoome more Industrial* 
ined. Danger of oreating irridentist feelings
would he prasemt if the Oder-Neisse line beeame final.?
Be also suggested forming a eoimission to make reoomien*
dations on the new border.®
Marshall questiomM the praotioality of giving
Poland agrioulturel areas between Upper Silesia and
Danzig, when he stated;
Qermmn pre*war Imports of foodstuffs had providWl 
about one*fifth of the total food oonsumed in 
Germany. Before the war, the German area j^w under 
provisional Polish oontrol also eontributed over a 
fifth of Germany's total food supply. If Germany 
anst, ia the future. Import two*fifths or more of
d. George Gat let mrshall (1880* ). As General of
the United States Army, he served as cmief of Staff, 
1939*1943. Bis first diplomatie mission was as 
United States Ambassador to China, 1945*1947. Dur* 
ing the nsKt two years, he was Seoretary of State.
7. (U.S.) Department of state, Germany. 1947*1949.
pp. 145*148. 
a. Ibid.. pp. 145*148.
her fooâ empply from abroad, the Qermam eeomwy would 
here to be iadustrlaiized to an ever greater extent 
than before the war or Germany would beeome a eon* 
geeted slum In the oenter of @urope.*
Althou#i Pranee traditionally hated Germany, she agreed
with the Ameriean point of view# The Frenoh attitude was
a reversal of her position in 1945. Then, Pranoe aeeepted
without protest the implieation that the Oder-Heisse line
would be final. Now Pranee realized the danger in requir­
ing an inoreased German population to live within deoreased
t I 
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a r e a s , A n d  Grea Britain was in aoeord with the United
States and Pranee.
In reply to Marshall, Molotov reiterated Polish argu­
ments for the Oder-Heisse line. The possibilities of 
German industrial expansion and the rise of irridentima 
did not bother the Soviet Union. In Hovmaber, at the
London meeting of the Counoil, the deedloek eontinued.
12Molotov vetoed plans for a eommission.
Between 1948 and 1950, a pesos oonferenoe did not oon- 
vene beoeuse the four powers failed to aohieve eoonomie 
unity in Oermsny. Hoonomio unity never matured beoause of
9. Ibid.. pp^ 145*148.
10. Ibid.. pp. 146-148.
11. Ibid.. pp. 146-148.
12. (U.S. ) Department o:
Gomtlm&ea aim@#r#ement om reparations* During t&la 
period, the Oermam-Pollsh border question deoXined in im- 
portanee for it beoame evident that Qerman^r lost an even 
larger area, the soviet none* Germany was virtually 
divided in two, and by 1981, a four power pease settlement 
seemed Impossible.
The Soviet Dnion still maintained that reparations 
from Oexnmny should be ezaoted in the form of dollars, ior 
Poland and Soviet Bussia, the prloe was ten billion at 1988 
values. In the f o m  of 1947 German production, it would 
take Gersmny at least twenty years to pay. "It implied 
/sio7 the establishment of an eoonomio power so comprehen­
sive that it wcntld be in reality a power of life and death 
over any German G o v e r n m e n t . ©eoretary Marshall summarized 
the Western viewpoint as follows;
. . .  we are confronted with a dmiand for repara­
tions in exoess of the Potsdam agre^ent which would 
make a Gmrman government subservient to its repara­
tions creditor. It is therefore clear that agree­
ment can be reached only under conditions which 
would not only enslave the German people but would 
seriously retard the recovery of all lurope.*^
Before a peace oonferenoe for Germany could be con­
sidered, it was essential that German internal conditions 
provide a sound basis for the foimatlon of a ^vemment,
13. Ibid.. pp. 193-198.
14. Ibid.. pp. 193-195*
n
Th# eeomomlo ohaoe, created by the reparations issue, was 
umsoumd for a new government. Thus the West rejected soviet 
proposals for the esteblislment of a strong Oentral govern* 
m«it*^® AS long as reparations remained unsettled and no 
authority existed to control soviet unilateral actions, a 
German peace treaty was out of the question.^®
Between March 50, 1948, and May 4, 1949, the Soviet 
Union tried to oust the West from Berlin. Since 1949, Western 
powers tried to obtain currency reform for all of Gemany.
The Soviet Union interpreted the suggestion as interference 
In her nones, and plans never materialized. As an economic 
necessity, the West introduced financial reforms into their 
zones. In retaliation, the soviet Union Issued restrictive 
measures on transportation going in and out of western Berlin, 
zones. All communications between western Berlin and other 
Western zones halted in July. The soviet Union denounced 
these measures as harmful because she claimed the intro­
duction of the Western mark into Berlin destroyed the Soviet
19zones* economy.
15.
15. (U.S.) Department of State, Qejyny 1949-1949, jg|e
Story in Documents. European and British Commonwealth 
Series 9, Publication 3556, March 1950, pp. 64-69.
19. Ibid.. pp. 202-223. For further information, See;
Lucius D. Clay, Decision In Germany (Mew Iork,^60), pp. 358-392.
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Darlmg the mmct year# aegotlatlooa proved to be abor­
tive. Bamala** aolmtlom required soviet oomtrol of Berllm
18ourreac^. Without the Weateru gigantie airlift program 
Chreat Britain, Irauee# and the Halted states sould have had 
to ooaoede to the Soviet llaioa. After a year mad a half# 
the four power» eomproaised. They issued oaly Soviet 
mirreaey ia Berlin, but it was under ooatrol of the four
powers. The eompromise still left the ourreaey problem
19open for future reform. It was olearly a western victory 
by which Soviet Russia lost prestige in Geimsay. However, 
the dispute revealed Ü.S.S.R. Intentions to bring Germany 
within the Soviet sphere by any means.
The failure to achieve German economic unity, the 
Soviet barrier between Eastern and Western zones, and the 
Berlin Crisis produced a decided stiffness la Western policy, 
a determination to stop Soviet advance even if it meant war, 
and the rise of a new Germany. The BOrth Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was the result, in which western countries of 
Burope plus the United states, Canada, and Iceland estab-
gAllshed machinery for the formation of a mropean Army.
During the same year of 1949, the west formed a German
18. Ibid.. pp. 202-223.
19. Ibid., pp. 202-223.
80. (U.S.) Department of State, Participation of theplM Mwasai M  MMSmss,»Publication 4591, ReleasedOotobar, 1958, pp. 20-31.
Vë
fmà&r&l ereateâ oui; of the three «estera zones.
la Mey of the following year, Pranee Introâueeë the sehemaa 
Plea «hleh proposed to merge la a single max^et, German end 
Preaoh ooal and steel Industries with those of say other 
mropeaa oouatry.®* It Is slgalflesnt that the Halted States 
and not soviet Russia partlolpeted In these plans, fhe for­
mer intended to stay la ISurope and mot leave Germany to de­
fault. Even without a German pease treaty, the western 
powers oontlnued with the German political and eoonomie 
reoovery program.
The loss of Russian prestige eaa best be expressed ^  
the failure of the eommmlst party in western zones. # e a  
the Soviet authorities Imposed a land blookade on Berlin, 
the fortunes of the ocxsmuniat party In western Germany 
deollned beoause the German people held the oommmlsts 
responsible for the hardships inf listed on the oltlzens of 
Berlin. The week alibis presented by the oommnlsts In 
justlfloatlon of the blookade made little Is^resslon on 
the German publie. The munlolpal and county eleetlons la
North Rhine Westphalia and In Sohleswlg-Bolsteln In Ootober,
%
1948, showed the waning of somaunlmm. T h ^  polled 7.8 per 
sent of the votes in Narth Rhine Westphalia and S.3 per sent
01. (U.S.) Department of State, Qenaany 1947-1949. The
Story in Doouments. European and British doWonwsalth 
Series 9, PsfflToatloa 3SSë, Marsh 1950, pp. 279-305.
22, (O.S.) Department of state, in ^alysls of the
Schuman Plan, lurcq?ean and British Oammnwe^tn 
Series 23, Publication 4175, April 1961, pp. 3-8.
n
iQ S o h l e m w l t e l m , oompared with 15.9 per eemt and 4.7 
per dent reepeetively la 1947 la the same areas, fhe 
oommmlsts suffered a similar loss at the mualolpal amd 
oouaty eleotloas la Lower saxoay the same year. Ia 19B0, 
there was a further drop la eomsualet strength.^
Oa Juae 6 . 1980, the asst Oermaa Gorerameat oeded 
thlrty-alme thoussad square miles to polaad.^* This ual- 
laterel aotloa was the seeoad Soviet attempt to seoure the 
Oder-Heisse border for Polaad. If it was meaat to intimi­
date or force a Western mbmisslon, the Soviet program 
failed, fhe United States and Great Britain protested the 
aotloa as violating Potsdam oommltmeats. Bit the West also 
reiterated their pledges to Poland. They again promised 
revisions la Poland's favor to the north and west at the 
peace oonferenoe.^®
There was a stronger reaction la Germany. The German 
Federal Government, on Jhne 9, formally rejected the agree­
ment between Poland and the eastern Soviet zone and Issued 
a statement declaring all agréments entered into by the 
last Geman government null end void, and denied the
egletter the right to speak la the name of the German people.
S3. (U.S.) Office of the High Oosmissioner For Germany,
Report on Germany. September SI, 1949 - Jhly 31, 1932, 
pip. li-W.
24. New York Times, July 7, 1950, p. 10.
25. Ibid.. pp. 18-22.
26. New York Times. July 1 0 , 1950, p. 12.
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Th# day after the agreement, ten thousand German refngees 
from eastern territories protested soviet aotlon,^^ fhe 
mayor of West Berlin dealered that: "an understanding on
the border must be made between a free Germany and a free
88Poland and not one that is ruled by the soviet Marshall. "
At Hanover, fifty thousand refugees, having been driven 
froa Silesia, met in protest. One hundred aommunist leaders 
who opposed the Kremlin’s foreign polloy formed the Indepen­
dent Demooratla party and rejeeted the East Gerœm govern­
ment’s agremsent to renounee all territories east of the
89Oder-Heleee line. with the favor she gained In Poland,
the U.8 .8 .R. lost just as much in Germany.
fhe Western foreign ministers met in Mew fork during
September. They oonsidered using a German army In the
MOrth Atlantis Treaty Organization. In November, the
soviet Union suggested a meeting of the four powers be
held to dlsouss German disarmament. The United states was
not willing to oall a oonferenoe, and in a note she stated:
. . .  We find it somewhat extraordinazy that the 
Soviet Goveriment should be so eager that this 
meeting be held promptly. The Soviet G&vemmeat 
delayed over five months, its reply to our m t e  of 
last May oalllng upon the soviet authorities in 
Geraany to disband the extmisive and heavily armed 
paramilitary foroes, whioh they have oreated In the
27. Ibid., p. 12.
28. Ibid.. p. ©.
89. Ibid,, p. 6•
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meterrn z o m  • . . Q#rmmny is not a problem which can
be isolated from the context of similar areas of ten­sion elsewhere.30
On December B2, the three powers seat soviet Russia 
identical notes which maintained that German participation 
in the Western European defense plans was not the oaly cause
of world tension. Finally In February the soviet Union agreed 
to discuss other matters at the conference. The foreign 
deputies met in Paris from March to May and could not agree
on an agenda. The possibility of a final peace treaty for
SIGermany was out of the question at that time.
The period between 1947 and 19S1 produced nothing 
toward the German peace treaty and hence, the settlement
of the German-Pollsh border question. During the four years, 
the West maintained that they did not consider the Oder- 
Heisse frontier as final, and that it could not be so as­
sumed until the German peace treaty was signed. Hor did 
the West recognize the unilateral actions of soviet Russia, 
but they were powerless to prevent the Soviets from giving 
thirty-nine thousand square miles to the Poles. In all 
practical respects, except for international recognition, 
howiver, the border was final. And therefore, the German- 
Polish boundary lost its importance as a frontier problem.
30. Ibid.. p. 6.
31. (U.S.} Department of state, Department of staterol. ZI, NO. pp. 489-468.Bulletin. Vo X Ho 889, Publication 2499,SayTlitl,
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Bit as a politioel weapoa. It played a great part la Western 
polloy to halt the spread of soviet laflaenee la Qermaay.
And this Is how the Germaa-Po 11 sh border will remain along 
the Oder-Meisse until the German peace treaty la signed.
CRAPTgR V 
00NGLD8I0M
The thirty-nine thousand miles of disputed territory 
ehioh Poland has eontrolled sines the end of the ear will 
be eomditioned by three faotors if there is a settlement ;
eeonomioa, irredentism, and atelinigm.
from the eoonomie standpoint, the border must be ad­
justed so that both Polish and German finaneial stability 
in world trade earn enable their inhabitants to produoe a 
living. It la essential that Poland should have Danzig be- 
oanse that seaport is the natural outlet for the Vistula 
River. The Vistula Basin is the heart of Poland by whioh 
her inland produets are transported to the sea. Beoause 
the U.S.B.R. has taken Konlgsberg in Bast Prussia, Danzig 
and Gdynia are the only other major seaports on the Bel tie 
that Poland oould have. It would m>t be a loss for Germany 
beoause she has many western ports. Bit Danzig would be 
the only main seaport for Poland. The Amerioan plan in- 
eluded a ooastline of one hundred miles west along the 
Baltic for Poland* Germany oould do without this also.
Poland is low on raw materials for industry. She is 
virtually an a^icultural producing area. Upper Silesia, 
with the ooal potentiality would help to balance Polish 
economy so that she would not have to depend entirely upon
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export# for industrial raw materials. Germany does not need 
ooal or the Industries of Silesia as mioh as agrioultural 
produoing areas whioh are essential to her eoonomy, Ger­
many*# main home souree for foodstuffs before the war was 
the seetlon between Danzig in the north and Upper Silesia 
in the south. If Germany were to lose this permanently, 
she would have to import two-fifths of her foodstuffs. And 
to do this, she mmst then inerease her industrial output by 
one-fifth of her 1936 level to balanoe her trade. With the 
expulsion of about six million Germans out of this area 
sines the war end about five million Poles from east of the 
(Mrzon Line, both Germany and Poland have the problem of 
supporting a larger population on redueed areas. Although 
Poland does not need the area east of the Oder-Meisse for 
her agrioultural produotion, she does meed room for her 
people. And of oourse, Germany has the same problem, fhe 
United States wanted to set up a ooamisslon to investigate 
the oondltions here with the idea that the territory would 
be divided some way between Poland Qemai^. For these 
reasons, only a partial border oan be determined at the 
present. Danzig and Upper Silesia should go to Poland, and 
the agrioultural area divided between Qenaany and Poland by 
a oommlasion.
But eooncHaio oonsi derat ions alone would not assure a 
stable frontier. If Germany's loss were too great, she 
might again use it as an exouse for aggression. Althou#i
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Gemaaj owned Danzig and the corridor from 1798 to 1914, 
Hitler*8 Danzig ambition# were provoked by the desire to 
link last Pressla with the Fatherland, How that last Prussia 
Is divided between Poland and the U.s.s.R,, there will be no 
geo#paphl@@l excuse, that all of Germany*# territory should 
be linked together. But Upper Silesia belonged to Prussia 
since 1740; actually, from an historical point of view,
German irredentism could work up a case for Danzig, Silesia, 
and the agricultural area between. German Irredentism fed 
by m, unstable economy would be dangerous and a cause for 
future disputes over the Qerman-Poliah frontier. However, if 
the Poles gave Germany enough land to help with her food­
stuffs problem, the effect of German loss elsewhere might be 
amdlfled.
Bit the whole decision rests on the will of the Soviet 
Union. The United states, Great Britain, and %ance are 
unable to move the border, without going to war. The 
U.S.S.B. has several alternatives. She oould win French 
support, perhaps, for the Oder-Nelsee line by backing Frenoh 
annexation of the Saar at the Peace Conference. Because 
Poland is a Soviet satellite, the soviet Uplon could com­
promise with Germans In hopes of gaining Influence In 
Germany. However, placing Germany over Poland would probably 
be unsuccessful because Germans have shown by elections they 
do not like comminlsm in any form. And German attitude Is 
evident to the Soviet Union. If she had thought there was
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a ahamae for oomamnlam amd Soviet Inflmenoe In Oermamy, 
the vouid not have foroed the Beat zone to eede
the area to Poland la 1950# It la probably that the Soviet 
Vnlon will do nothing. If there ia a German peaee treaty 
in the near future, the ïï.s.s.R. oan insist on the Allies 
reaognizing the Oder-Reiaae as final beoause the soviet 
Union has military eomend of the area end she has moved 
in millions of Poles who are already settled. Unless 
Russia oan obtain a better trade on some other question 
at the peace conference, the Oder*Reisse is the final 
border between Germany and Poland until the next war.
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jüPPZNDIZ
à Partial Text of the protoool oT the prooeedlxge of the
Yalta Oomfereaee
V. Reparation
The following protocol has been approved:
1# Germany must pay In kind for the loaeae caused hy 
her to the Allied nations In the course of the war. Repara­
tions are to be received in the first Instance by those 
countries which have bourne the main burden of the war, have 
suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over 
the enmay,
2. Reparation In kind la to be exacted from Germany 
In three following forma:
a) Removals within two years from the surrender of 
Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the 
national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany 
herself as well as outside her territory {equipment, machine- 
tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares 
of Industrial, transport and other enterprises In Germany etc.), 
these removals to be carried out chiefly for purposes of 
destroying the war potential of Germany.
b) Annual deliveries of goods from current produc­
tion for a period to be fixed.
c) Use of German labour.
3. For the working out on the above principles of 
a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an 
Allied Reparation Commission will be set up In Moscow. It 
will consist of three representatives— one from the Union of
Soviet 8.R., one from the UK and one from the USA.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the 
reparation as well as the distribution of It among the coun­
tries which suffered from the German aggression the soviet and 
Merlcan delegations agreed as follows:
"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take In Its 
Initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation 
la accordance with the point (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2
should be 20 billion dollars and that 50$ of It should go to
the Union of soviet 8.R.
The British delegation was of the opinion that pend­
ing consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow 
Reparations Commission as one of the proposals to be con­
sidered by the Commission.
92
711# Poland
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Con­
ference:
A new eituatlon hee been oreeted in Poland ae a 
reenlt of her ooe^lete liberation by the Red Army. Thie 
ealle for the eetabliahment of a polish Provlalonal Govern» 
ment whioh oan be more broadly baaed than warn possible before 
the recent liberation of western part of Poland. The Provi­
sional Government whioh is now functioning in Poland should 
therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with 
the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and 
from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be 
called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and sir A. Clark Kerr are 
authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance 
in Moscow with mwbers of the present Provisional Govern­
ment and with other Polish democratic leaders from within 
Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization 
of the present Government along the above lines. This 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be 
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as 
soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections ell democratic and 
anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and 
to put forward candidates.
When a polish Provisional Government of National 
Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, 
the Government of the U88B, which now maintains diplomatic 
relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, 
and the Government of the UK and the Government of the USA 
will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity, end will exchange 
Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will 
be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the 
lastern frontier of Poland should follow the Ourzon Line 
with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight 
kilometres ia favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland 
must receive substantial accessions of territory in the 
North and West, They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be 
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions 
and that the final delimitations of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.
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A Partial Text of the Potadam 
Deelermtlom
IV. Beparatioas
1. Rapmratioaa elalms of the U88R shall be met by removal#
from the zone of Germaay oooupied by the U8S3R aad from 
appropriate German external eaeete,
8* The ÜSSB undertakes to settle the reparation elalms of 
Poland from it# own share of reparations.
3. The reparation elalms of the United states, the United 
Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall 
be met from the western zones and from appropriate German 
external assets.
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR 
from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive 
additionally from the Western Zones: (A) IB percent of
such usuable and complete industrial capital equipment, in 
the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine 
manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German 
peace economy and should be r«moved from the western zones 
of Germany, ia exchange for an equivalent value of food, 
coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum pro­
ducts, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.
(B) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as
is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be 
rwaoved from the western zones, to be transferred to the 
Soviet Government on reparations account without payment 
or exchange of any kind in return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (A) and (B) 
above shall be made simultaneously.
5. The aimunt of equipment to be removed from the western 
zones on account of reparations must be determined within 
six sE^nths from now at the latest.
6 . Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as 
soon as possible and shall be completed within two years 
from the determination specified in paragraph 5, The de­
livery of products covered by 4(A) above shall begin as 
soon as possible end shall be made by the USSR in agreed 
installments within five years of the date hereof. The 
determination of the amount and character of the industrial 
capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy 
end therefore available for reparations shall be made by 
the control council under policies fixed by the Allied 
Ooomiselon of Reparations, with the participation of 
France, subject to the final approval of the zone com­
mander in the zone from which the equipment is to be 
removed.
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7» Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment sub­
ject to remoTel, edrenoe deliveries shall be made in reepeot 
of suoh equipment ae will be determined to be eligible for 
delivery in aeoordanoe with the procedure set forth in the 
last eentenee of paragraph Ô.
8, The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of 
r^aratlons to shares of German enterprises which are located 
in the western zones of occupation in Germany as well as to 
German foreign assets in all cwintries except those specified 
in paragraph 9 below.
9* The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America renounce their claims in respect of repara­
tions to shares of German enterprises lAich ere located in 
the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to 
German foreign assets In Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Rumania and Eastern Austria#
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured 
by the Allied troops in Germany,
VI.
City of Koenlgsberg and Adjacent Area
The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet 
Government that pending the final determination of terri­
torial questions at the peace settlement the section of the 
western frontier of the Union of soviet socialist Republics 
which is adjacent to the Baltic sea should pass from a point 
of the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north 
of Braunsberg-Qoldep, to the meeting point of the frontiers 
of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and Bast Prussia.
The conference has agreed in principle to the pro­
posal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate 
transfer to the soviet Union of the City of Eoenigsberg and 
the area adjacent to it as described above subject to ex­
pert examination of the actual frontier.
The President of the United states end the British 
Prime Minister have declared that they will support the 
proposal of the conference at the forthcoming peace 
settlement.
II.
Poland
the Polish provisional Government of Rational 
Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement: 
A. We have taken note with pleemire of the agreement reached 
among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has
fS
mma# poeaible the formation, In aooordanoe with the deeisiona 
reaehed at the Crimea Oonferenoe, of a Polish Provisional 
Gtoverittaeat of National Unity reoognized hy the three powers, 
fhe eatahllatment by the British and United States Govern­
ments of diplomatie relations with the Polish Provisional 
Goverm&ent has resulted in the withdrawal of their recog­
nition from the former Polish Government in London, whloh 
no longer exists.
The British end United States Governments have taken 
measures to protect the Interest of the Polish Provisional 
Government as the recognized government of the Polish state 
In the property belonging to the polish state located in 
their territories and under their control, whatever the form 
of this may be. They have further taken measures to prevent 
alienation to third parties of such property. All proper 
facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Govern­
ment for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for 
the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State 
which may have been wrongfully alienated.
The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish 
Provisional Government In facilitating the return to Poland 
as soon as practicable of all poles abroad who wish to go, 
including members of the Polish armed forces and the 
Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return 
home shall be accorded p ersonal and property rights on the 
same basis as all Polish citizens.
The three powers note that the Polish Provisional 
Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea 
Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered 
elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal 
suffrage and secret ballot in whioh all dmsocratic and 
anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to 
put forward candidates, and that representatives of the 
Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the 
imrld upon developments in Poland before and during the 
elections
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached 
at the Crimea Conference the three heads of government have 
sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity in regard to the Accession of territory in 
the north end west which Poland should receive. The presi­
dent of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been 
received at the Conference and have fully presented their 
views. The three heads of government reaffirm their opin­
ion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of 
Poland should await the pemoe settlement.
The three heads of government agree that, pending 
the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the 
former German territories east of a line running from the 
Baltic Sea immWiately west of Swlnemunde, and thence along
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the Oder Hirer to the oomflwemee of the west era Neleee Hirer 
aad aloag the restera Mel see to the Czeohoelorek frontier, 
laeladiag that portion of gaet Prasaia not placed under the 
admialstratiom of the Union of sorlet socialist Hepuhlice 
ia accordance with the understanding reached at this con­
ference and including the area of the former free City of 
Danzig, shall he under the administration of the Polish 
State and for such purposes should not he considered as part of the sorlet zone of occupation in Germany.
31II.
Orderly Transfers of German Populations
The conference reached the following agreement on 
the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
HungaryÎ
The three governments haring considered the question 
in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany 
of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining la 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be under­
taken. They agree that any transfers that take place 
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.
Since the influx of a large number of Germans 
into Germany would increase the burden already resting on 
thecBccupylag authorities, they consider that the Allied 
Control Council in Germany should in the first instance 
examine the problem with special regard to the question 
of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the 
several zones of occupation. They are accordingly in­
structing their respective representatives on the Control 
Council to report to their goveriments as soon as possible 
the extent to whioh such persons have already entered 
Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to 
submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further 
transfers could be carried out, having regard to the 
present situation in Germany.
The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional 
Ctovernaent end the Control Council in Hungary are at the 
same time being infoimied of the above, and are being re­
quested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending 
the examination by the governments concerned of the report 
from their representatives on the Control Council.
